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Preface 
Ewa Anna Kumelowski 
 
 
The following volume is a compilation of student-produced texts written over the course of a 
semester-long Q-Team research-based learning class at the Humboldt University of Berlin. The 
aim of this course was to explore the various understandings and definitions of Yugoslav culture 
through the prism of its representations found primarily in the archives of the German Foreign 
Service, compelling the students to design and carry out original research projects in line with 
their personal academic interests. While practical circumstances made it difficult to create the 
ideal conditions for studying the different representations of Yugoslav culture, the authors’ 
collective focus on the archives of the German Foreign Service, and to a much lesser extent, 
the German State Archives have resulted not only in thoughtful research design but also in 
creative approaches to an already complicated subject.  
This exercise has resulted in a series of five co-authored papers treating a multitude of topics 
addressing the concept of culture in the Yugoslav context, as seen through the eyes of 
diplomatic staff. Each text is an entirely novel and original approach developed by the students 
themselves, making up a heterogenous compilation that explores the different stages of the 
research process, and providing a modest contribution to contemporary scholarship on 
Yugoslav cultural history. While the students have received guidance over the course of the 
semester, these texts are primarily reflections of their individual work as it progresses from 
traditional coursework assignments into true academic writing. The course structure and the 
resulting volume are therefore not a classical contribution to academic literature as much as an 
active reflective process, creating a space for young researchers to explore and form their 
practice as historians.   
The decidedly challenging assignment resulted in the production of five cooperative 
chapters, mobilizing a wide range of definitions of what Yugoslav culture can be understood 
as. Chapter 1 provides a well-researched space for discussion on the importance of sports 
practices in nation-building endeavours, exploring how cross-border communication 
surrounding various sporting events can be understood within the framework of East-West 
political relationships. Circling around to a more traditional definition of culture, Chapter 2 
explores the way in which West German audiences and diplomats interpreted Yugoslav national 
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and supranational cultures through the prism of TV production. Chapter 3 discusses the culture 
of remembrance 
surrounding the Second World War, comparing the divergent discourses that characterized the 
visiting of German war-graves in Yugoslavia. The authors of Chapter 4 examine the tensions 
between various interpretations of Yugoslav folk culture and cultures through the eyes of FDR 
diplomats, exploring the impact of its development on folk culture and local identity-building. 
Finally, Chapter 5 deals with a broader understanding of the word, discussing the manner in 
which political and economic culture impacted relationships between Yugoslavia and West 
Germany.
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Sports, Politics and Culture in Yugoslavia Through the Prism of 
Diplomatic Relations. A Miscellany About German-Yugoslav Sports 
Relations  
Andreas Charis and Julen Kenk Fernandez 
 
 
“Sport is not merely sport”.1 Sport belongs to daily life and has increased in popularity among 
societies since we have been connected through the spreading of media. During the 20th century 
sports became an important actor in cultural terms that is difficult to ignore. Furthermore, it has 
also played a key role in political spheres, despite the “myth of its political autonomy” in which 
it is often imbued.2 This is precisely the disregarded feature that Michael Billig refers to with 
the term “banal nationalism”. Sports, as a daily representation and a mass phenomenon is the 
scenario where those ideological habits are reproduced. 3  Due to historiography, this is 
especially true in the history of Yugoslavia.4 
Except for the violent game between Dinamo Zagreb and Red Star Belgrade on the 13th May 
1990, very little is known about Yugoslavian football in the socialist and post-socialist context. 
This football match has been considered mainly by the press, as the outbreak of the war and 
therefore, it gained a lot of interest amidst the spectators.5 From the beginning itself, even 
during the Ottoman and the Habsburg times, led by the Balkan national movements, sports were 
important for the creation of national feelings, as shown with the Sokol-movement.6 Sports 
history of post-war Yugoslavia is less well researched. It particularly lacks investigations in 
cultural and social history.7 In addition, the importance of sports for realizing a feeling of 
belonging among Yugoslav people has so far rather been postulated than truly being proved in 
an empirical manner. That is why, this article aspired to further illuminate the state’s attempt 
 
1 Billig, Michael, Banal nationalism, London 1995, p. 119. 
2 For a detailed analysis about the connections between sport and politics, see Allison, Lincoln, The Politics of 
Sport, Manchester 1986, pp. 17-21. 
3 See Billig, Banal nationalism, p. 6.  
4  See Blasius, Martin, Fußball, nationale Repräsentationen und Gesellschaft. Die Nationalmannschaft im 
Jugoslawien der 1980er, in: Südosteuropäische Hefte 4,1 (2015), pp. 87-126, here p. 89. 
5 Đorđević, Ivan, Twenty Years Later: The War Did (not) Begin at Maksimir. An Anthropological Analysis of 
the Media Narratives about a Never Ended Football Game, in: Glasnik Etnografskog Instituta SANU, 60, 2 (2013), 
pp. 201-14. 
6 See Rohdewald, Stefan, Zugänge zu einer Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des südosteuropäischen Sports unter 
besonderer Berücksichtigung Jugoslawiens, in: Anke Hilbrenner/Ekatarina Emeliatseva/Christian Koller/Manfred 
Zoller/Stefan Zwicker (eds.), Handbuch der Geschichte Osteuropas, Regensburg 2014, p. 1-18, here p. 3f.  
7 See ibid.  
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of creating a feeling of national unity through sports and whether or not it is perceived by the 
German diplomats. The focus has been set on representations which can be found in material 
from diplomatic archives. Due to its good accessibility, the diplomatic sources of the FRG and 
the GDR, from their founding of the state in 1949 until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, have 
been analysed regarding sports in Yugoslavia.  
It seems likely that German diplomat’s comments on the Yugoslav state’s attempt to create 
a feeling of unity in case of the interplay of two factors. Firstly, in a period of a received crisis 
and secondly, in case of an important sports event in Yugoslavia in which German athletes 
participated. So, one can assume that the 1976 European Football Championship taking place 
in Yugoslavia rather shortly after the first signs of upcoming nationalisms as the Croatian 
Spring or the 1984 Olympics in Sarajevo might be accurate starting points for researching.1 
Moreover, in 1974, West Germany hosted the Football World Cup, where the FRG ended up 
as the winners. Yugoslavia was present and also played against the host team. Once again in 
the European Championship, two years later, the West German team defeated the Plavi. The 
1980s also saw matches between both German teams and Yugoslavia. The so-called scandal of 
Luxemburg of 1983 and the victory in the 1987 U20 World Cup were also interesting case 
studies.2 However, during the whole timeframe Yugoslav domestic politics were not of interest 
for both German sports-politics. This seems to shift as recently as the late 1980s or at the 
beginning of the 1990s when ethno-nationalist politics began to escalate. At that point, a West 
German diplomat interpreted the central government’s decision for Belgrade instead of Zagreb 
to apply for the Olympics in 1992 as domestically politically motivated. To him, it was intended 
to bolster the central state. Thus, from his point of view it was evident why the Bosniak Branko 
Mikulic was chosen to become the President of the Organizing Committee.3   
As it was rather impossible to show the degree to which the Yugoslav state tried to generate 
a feeling of unity through sports in diplomatic representations, it is now intended to ask for 
likeable reasons that both the German diplomacies did not notice any. Since the importance of 
sports for a feeling of unity among the Yugoslavs is prominently postulated in research, it is 
likely that the state tried to generate such feelings.4 Therefore, the focus will be put on the 
 
1 See Calic, Marie-Janine, Geschichte Jugoslawiens im 20. Jahrhundert, Munich 2014, p. 237-55. 
2 These two cases are extensively studied in Blasius, Fußball, nationale Repräsentationen und Gesellschaft, pp. 
99–114. 
3  See PA/AA, Zwischenarchiv, Rheker, “Bewerbung Belgrads als Austragungsort der Sommerolympiade 
1992”, 1986 (112/727). 
4 See for example, Dolić, Dubravko, Die Fußballnationalmannschaft als “Trägerin nationaler Würde“? Zum 
Verhältnis von Fußball und nationaler Identität in Kroatien und Bosnien–Herzegowina, in: Peter Lösche/Undine 
Ruge/Klaus Stolz (eds.), Fußballwelten. Zum Verhältnis von Sport, Politik, Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, Opladen 
2002, pp. 155–74, here p. 157. 
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FRG’s/GDR’s – Yugoslav relations in sports politics.5 Here it is aimed to investigate the 
motivations of the German states to entertain relations with the south-eastern European state.  
It will deal with the thesis that German diplomats did not comment on nationalisms and the 
state’s reactions in Yugoslavia, because they were too confined to the German Question. 
In 1959, two years after Yugoslavia had begun to entertain relations with the GDR, both 
countries established sports relations manifested in a bilateral treaty. East Germany aimed to 
build sports relations “auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung, der gegenseitigen Achtung 
und Anerkennung, zum Nutzen beider Sportorganisationen.”6 So, it should be interpreted as its 
main goal to gain de facto international recognition through (successful) participation in sports 
events.7 As it is written in an SED Central Committee’s pattern: “Only through high sporting 
achievements can the slalom racers of the German Democratic Republic, after the declaration 
of sovereignty of the Soviet Union for our country, contribute to the further strengthening of 
the authority of our workers' and farmers' state”.8 This statement must be seen in its historical 
context. At that point the GDR was not diplomatically recognized by any Western Bloc state 
and the status of Berlin was not fully solved. So, it is evident that at the highest state level sport 
relations were being negotiated. Due to that argument, the GDR claimed tournaments between 
national teams instead of club competitions.9  
Another reason lay at the domestic level. As it is postulated in the humanities, national teams 
can more easily mobilise the feelings of unity among widespread people than regional sports 
 
5 A monograph focusing the German Yugoslav sports relations is still missing in historiography. Even three 
newer dissertations focusing on post-war German-Yugoslav relations do not understand sports as a remarkable 
political factor in diplomacy as all of them do not analyse sports relations (See Baer, Friederike, Zwischen 
Anlehnung und Abgrenzung. Die Jugoslawienpolitik der DDR 1946 bis 1968, Köln 2009; Theurer, Marc Christian, 
Bonn – Belgrad – Ost-Berlin. Die Beziehungen der beiden deutschen Staaten zu Jugoslawien im Vergleich 1957-
1968, Berlin 2008 and Maricic, Alan, “Lucky that East Germany also exists". Yugoslavia between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (1955-1968), Waterloo 2019.). The German Soviet 
relations on that field are better researched. See Mertin, Evelyn, Sowjetisch-deutsche Sportbeziehungen im ‚Kalten 
Krieg‘, Sankt Augustin 2009. For an early approach on East Germans international sports relations, see Lehmann, 
Norbert, Internationale Sportbeziehungen und Sportpolitik der DDR. Teil 1. Entwicklung und politische 
Funktionen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutsch-deutschen Sportbeziehungen, Münster 1986.  
6 BArch, DY 30/60902, Arbeitsgruppe Sport, “Konzeption für die Verhandlungen mit dem Sportbund der 
Föderativen Volksrepublik Jugoslawien”, 1961. Our translation: “On the basis of equality, mutual respect and 
recognition, for the benefit of both sports organisations” Nevertheless, there have been competitions in sports 
between east German and Yugoslav athletes even before the treaty of 1959. For instance, ski jumpers participated 
in an event in Planica in 1957 (see BArch, DY 30/60634, unknown author, “Protokoll Nr. 10/57 der Sitzung des 
Sekretariats des ZK vom 6. März 1957”, 1957, Bl. 556/10).   
7  Baer characterizes East Germany’s foreign policy until 1972 in general as primary “im ‘Kern 
Deutschlandpolitik’” (Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung, p. 296.). So, sports mirrored its policies.   
8 Translated from the original: “Nur durch hohe sportliche Leistungen können die Slalomfahrer der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik nach der Souveränitätserklärung der Sowjetunion für unser Land zur weiteren Stärkung 
der Autorität unseres Arbeiter- und Bauernstaates beitragen.” BArch, DR 5, unknown author, “Komitee-Vorlage 
Nr. St/21/3/54”, 1954 (536). 
9 BArch, DR 5, unknown author, “Komitee-Vorlage Nr. St/21/2/54”, 1954 (536).  
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clubs can.10 For both countries it was attractive to bind its people to the state. This especially 
applied to the initial phase and the early 1960s when thousands of people left the GDR. The 
SED Central Committee’s attempt for incorporating its athletes into the state is for example 
reflected in the fact that canoeists were taught political lessons in advance of the 1955 World 
Cup in Ljubljana.11 In those lessons the East German athletes were also informed about the 
“Verrat Titos” 12 (Tito’s treason) due to the state’s close relations to the USSR.13 At that time 
coaches and sports officials were encouraged to bind the athletes to the state by enhancing 
“political ethical education, to educate sportswomen and sportsmen, who love our German 
country and who fully support the GRD’s government and its president Wilhem Pieck […].”.14 
On the other hand Tito’s state was in a similar situation as it had to constitute a supranational 
identity among the post-war south Slavs. Therefore, sport was also assumed to be an opportune 
instrument.15  
Not surprisingly, the Yugoslav state was also interested in sport relations to its socialist sister 
state. For example, to a Yugoslav diplomat a specific national tournament held in 1964 was 
very important because it would result in “the enhancement and perpetuation of our bilateral 
relations.”16 This conception of sport, which “creates politically usable resources”17 resembles 
the thesis that sport is not just sport.  
We cannot dismiss the importance of symbolism in sports. Flag, anthem and international 
renown do perform their task. For example, when the 1970 World Figure Skating 
Championships were held in Ljubljana, East German diplomats insisted on the formulation of 
“German Democratic Republic” for labelling its athletes instead of “East Germany”. Moreover, 
they claimed the country to be called GDR in the Yugoslav media.18 The significance that the 
GDR gave to its symbols is again reflected in another diplomatic letter. It is noted that 
 
10 See Blasius, Fußball, nationale Repräsentationen und Gesellschaft, p. 89. 
11 See BArch, 5, unknown author, “Themenplan”, 1954 (536) 
12 Ibid.   
13 See Baer, Zwischen Anlehnung und Abgrenzung, p. 299. For an investigation concerning East-German 
motivations for bilateral sports relations with the USSR see Mertin, Sowjetisch-deutsche Sportbeziehungen, p. 
117-9. Mertin comes up with the same reasons as presented in this article.  
14  Translated from the orginial: “[…] die politisch-moralische Erziehungsarbeit zu verbessern, um 
Sportlerinnen und Sportler zu erziehen, die unsere deutsche Heimat lieben, die fest zur Regierung der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und unserem Präsidenten Wilhelm Pieck stehen […].“ BArch, DR 5, unknown author, 
“Perspektiven zur Entwicklung von Körperkultur und Sport in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik für das 
Jahr 1954”, 1953 (542). 
15 See Rohdewald, Zugänge zu einer Sozial- und Kulturgeschichte des südosteuropäischen Sports, p. 4. 
16 Translated from the orginal: “der Verstärkung und Festigung unserer gegenseitigen Beziehungen“. BArch, 
DY 12/5757, Generalsekretär, “Adletski Savez Jugoslavije”, p. 211. 
17 See Allison, The Politics of Sport, p. 12. 
18 See PA/AA, M 1 C, Münzer 1. Sekretär, “Aktenvermerk über ein Gespräch des Genossen Münser mit dem 
Stellvertreter des Vorsitzenden des Jugoslawischen Bundes für Sport und Körperkultur, Genossen Broegan, am 
11.2.70”, 1970, (1189/72). 
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Yugoslavia undertook “ the correct ceremonial (national anthem, flags, exact state name, in 
front of and in the hall GDR flags)”.19 Once more, it becomes obvious that East German 
diplomats insisted in terms of sports relations primarily on the state’s recognition and 
sovereignty while distancing itself from the FRG.  
GDR’s diplomatic correspondence with Yugoslav fellows in advance of the 1974 Olympics 
in Munich further belongs in the context of the relations between the two Germanys. Therefore, 
the East German diplomats were asked to convince their socialist comrades: 
“daß die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Olympischen Spiele 1972 
integrierender Bestandteil der Bonner Politik insbesondere der sogenannten 
Ostpolitik geworden ist, und wie der westdeutsche Imperialismus die Olympischen 
Spiele 1972 für die Durchsetzung seiner politischen Ziele mißbraucht [sic!].”20  
So, an enduring continuity is remarkable. From the GDR’s sovereignty from the USSR 
onwards, the East German state used sports as a field for distancing itself from the second 
German state with the aim of being internationally recognized. Hence, from their perception 
the FRG was an aggressive and expansionist state as it is claimed in a document from 1953 
shortly after the Stalin Note and his death:  
“Die Adenauer-Regierung ist dabei mit Hilfe der Bonner- und Pariserverträge [sic!] 
Westdeutschland zu einem aggressiven Werkzeug des Nord-Atlantik-Paktes zu 
machen. Die Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik ruft in ihrer 
Erklärung am 25.11.1953 alle friedliebenden Deutschen zur Sammlung gegen diese 
menschenfeindlichen und menschenverachtenden Bestrebungen der westdeutschen 
Imperialisten und Militaristen auf.”21  
For the same reason in an internal document an East German diplomat warned about the 
intensive relations between West German sports officials and those from Yugoslavia which 
 
19  Translated from the original: “dem korrekten Zeremoniell (Nationalhymne, Fahnen, exakte 
Staatsbezeichnung, vor und in der Halle DDR-Flaggen).” BArch, DY 30, Münzer 1. Sekretär “Entwicklung der 
sportlichen Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der SFRJ”, 1970 (96510). 
20 BArch, DY 30, unknown author, “Diskussionsbeitrag des Leiters der DDR-Delegation auf der Konferenz 
der Sportleitungen der sozialistischen Länder in Ulan Bator (MVA)”, 1972 (96510) Our translation: “[…] that the 
preparation and the realisation of the 1972 Olympics has become an integral part of Bonn’s politics especially of 
the so-called Ostpolitik and how the West German imperialism missuses the 1972 Olympics for the realisation of 
its political targets.” 
21 BArch, DR 5, unknown author, “Perspektiven zur Entwicklung von Körperkultur und Sport in der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik für das Jahr 1954”, 1953 (542) Our translation: “By means of the Bonn and Paris treaty 
the Adenauer-government is establishing West Germany as an aggressive instrument of the NATO. The 
government of the German Democratic Republic calls in his statement from 25th November 1953 all peace-loving 
Germans up for unity against this inhumane and misanthropic aspirations of the West German imperialists and 
militarists.”  
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should result in careful statements concerning the FRG towards them. Nonetheless, GDR’s 
diplomacy received the bilateral sports relation as satisfying.22  
Revealingly, even in advance of the 1955 canoe World Cup in Yugoslavia, instead of 
focusing on Yugoslav domestic policy, the East German diplomats used the specific sport as a 
political instrument for the German Question:  
“Ausgehend von der Tatsache, dass ein hervorragendes Abschneiden unserer 
Sportler in Jugoslawien einen Beitrag darstellt, der die Remilitarisierungspolitik 
Adenauers durchkreuzt und damit bei der Wiederherstellung der Einheit unseres 
Vaterlandes und der Erhaltung des Weltfriedens dient […].”23  
Having the given examples in mind, we come up with the main thesis that GDR’s (as well 
as FRG’s) diplomats were too confined to the German Question to perceive Yugoslav attempts 
to create a feeling of unity through sports during the whole period of investigation. To conclude, 
it is convenient to remark that despite the lack of documents reflecting the use of sports in order 
to build a sense of brotherhood and unity, there is still research to be done on this subject. In 
this respect, the information we were willing to seek might presumably be in archives in former 
Yugoslav countries. Parallel to this, in the process we realised that the GDR and FRG were 
more concerned about their own national question than Yugoslavia’s political issues. They had 
a twofold motivation to entertain sports relations. One the one hand, it was aspired to gain 
international recognition. On the other, it could be used to bind people to the state. Hence, sport 
is often surrounded by a halo of “banal” self-legitimating symbols that convert sport into more 
than a mere game, which is confirmed by the determinant East German policies. Dejan Zec and 
Miloš Paunović state that Yugoslavia made use of sports to create a common interest as is seen 
in the configuration of the football club Partizan Belgrade, the national team and the heroic 
narrative of Stjepan Bobek and Rajko Mitić.24 
 
 
 
 
 
22 See PA/AA, M 1 C, Oskar Fischer, “Informationsmaterial über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung der 
Olympische Spiele 1972 in München”, 1969 (1189/72). 
23 BArch, DR 5, unknown author,“Komitee-Vorlage Nr. St/21/2/54”, 1954 (536). Our translation: “Based on 
the fact that an outstanding result of our sportsmen in Yugoslavia will contribute to defeating Adenauer’s policy 
of remilitarisation, which will be conducive to the reestablishment of our fatherland’s unity and the perpetuation 
of the world peace […].”.  
24 See Zec, Dejan/Paunović, Miloš, Football’s positive influence on integration in diverse societies. The case 
study of Yugoslavia, in: Soccer & Society, 16, 2-3 (2015), pp. 237-40. 
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The TV-Perception of Yugoslavian Guest Workers by the FRG and 
Yugoslavia. A Pop Cultural Research 
Erik Nisevic, Alexandra Carvajales Treptow and Lara Zissner 
 
 
Guest workers played a major role in the diplomatic relations between West Germany and 
Yugoslavia. It is particularly interesting due to the fact that the topic is relatively under 
researched, and it is of great historic importance. The aim of the paper is to give a small insight 
into the perceptions of both sides on the subject through the analysis of contemporary media. 
The relevance of TV in modern politics and history was succinctly explained by Habermas, as 
he argued it is a sphere of public relations and that there is great political power in it1.  
The documents explored for this paper were found in the Political Archive of the 
Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin. The time frame in which this research is focused goes from the 
1960s until the 1980s. The question that best sums up the focus of this paper is: How were the 
cultural relations affected by the TV perceptions of guest workers in Germany and Yugoslavia? 
After analysing all the evidence, it will be demonstrated that: The West German officials 
were unwilling to completely integrate Yugoslavian guest workers and that Western film crews 
& Western programmes about Yugoslavia represented a big political threat to the Yugoslavian 
government. 
To do so, firstly the context will be set, it will be followed by an analysis on the Yugoslavian 
perspective and finally a detailed examination of the German perception will be presented.  
The West German perception of Yugoslavia must be examined in order to provide the 
context and groundwork for understanding how Yugoslav guest workers might have been 
perceived by the Germans, and why. To do this, three separate categories will be analysed, with 
the aim of giving a broad overview. These categories are, in the following order: general 
perception of the Yugoslav state and people, perception of different Yugoslav ethnicities, and 
lastly cultural relations between the two countries. To do this, the documents found in the 
foreign office’s political archive in Berlin will be utilised, to showcase the relevant views and 
opinions of the West German political class, and how these in some cases might have differed 
to those belonging to other members of West German society. 
 
1 Livingstone and Lunt, Talk on television audience participation and public debate, p. 10 
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One might expect to find a relatively favourable opinion of the Yugoslav state among the 
German political class, given how it was an outlier amongst the communist states of Europe by 
being much more open to the West, yet the evidence from the archive does not back this up. To 
start with, many documents about Yugoslavia could be found in “Ostblock” compilations, even 
though Yugoslavia was famously non-aligned. This shows the German political class deemed 
Yugoslavia unimportant enough to oversimplify matters to such a degree, but also that 
Yugoslavia being communist was deemed more important than their non-alignment. Indeed, 
the fact Yugoslavia was communist seemed to play quite an important role, and a negative one 
at that, in the German perception of the country and its people. For example, in the document 
titled ‘Zweijahresprogramm zum deutsch-jugoslawischen Kulturabkommen’, the foreign office 
is warned not to let Yugoslav scholars into certain sections of their archives as they are 
communist and might be working as spies.1 
Untrustworthiness was not the only negative trait that the Germans perceived in 
Yugoslavians. In a document describing the protocol of a conversation with President Tito, the 
following is said: “Die Jugoslawen scheinen immer davon auszugehen, daß alles, was auf dem 
Gebiet westlicher Integration geschehe von den Sowiets in Osteuropa nachgemacht werden 
würde und könnte!”2 It is clear that this statement was meant to be mocking, as given away by 
the unnecessary exclamation mark. Indeed, the writer seems to at once be mocking Yugoslavian 
naivety as well as the Eastern bloc’s incompetence (of which Yugoslavia was somewhat seen 
to be a part of). Furthermore, it seems these attitudes were broadly shared, as the passage was 
put in quotation marks with a pen by a second person, indicating that this little jab was seen as 
either significant or amusing enough to be highlighted. 
That is not to say Yugoslavia was completely unimportant to West Germany, nor that all 
opinions of the German political class were negative. Mihalo Jovanovic points out that in the 
early 1970s, Yugoslavia had a strong economic relationship with West Germany, who was its 
largest West European trade partner in imports, and second largest in exports (closely after 
Italy).3 This economic importance was recognised by the official Jaenicke, who wrote “Auf den 
Gebieten Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft finden deutsch-jugoslawische Begegnungen häufig statt. 
 
1 Dr. Weinandy, Brief, Betreff: Zweijahresprogramm zum deutsch-jugoslawischen Kulturabkommen, 
aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 118 Band 483, Belgrad 11. Mai 1976. 
2 Botschafter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bericht, Betreff: Besuch des Herrn Bundesministers des 
Auswärtigen in Jugoslawien, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 130 Band 2852, 
Belgrad 14. Dezember 1970. 
3 Mihalo Jovanovic, Yugoslav Trade with ECC and COMECON countries (1972), pp. 586-591 (pp. 586-587) 
(Online version), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3386&context=lcp (Accessed on 
10.02.2020). 
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Der Sektor Kultur sollte demgegenüber nicht zu sehr zurückstehen.”4 This also comes to show 
West Germany thought of Yugoslavia as important enough to actively facilitate cultural 
exchange, although this seems to have mostly been pursued for the sake of their economic 
relationship. In conclusion, the overall attitude of the West German political class towards 
Yugoslavia was not hostile, but cautious, condescending, and somewhat indifferent. 
Since Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state, where ethnic differences were a key factor in its 
eventual dissolution, it would be interesting and useful to examine how the Germans might 
have perceived and handled this multi-ethnicity. Elinor Despalatovic explains a famous 
historiographical narrative, which likely played a major role in influencing West German 
perceptions over time. The narrative is that since Rome converted the Croats and Slovenes to 
Christianity, they drew them into the civilization of western and central Europe, whereas Serbs 
were drawn into the civilization of the Byzantine Empire.5 Hans Kohn went a step further by 
arguing that the Catholic branches of Yugoslavia shared in the ‘higher’ Austrian and Italian 
civilizations, whereas the Orthodox branches lived in “incredibly backward conditions” under 
the Ottoman Empire.6 His book on Pan-Slavism was written in 1953, which explains why he 
used outdated concepts such as ‘higher civilizations’, but is on the other hand especially useful 
since it was written by a member of the German-speaking world, and may be a good indicator 
of what the German perception and attitude towards the Yugoslav ethnicities may have been 
around that time, with the implication that Croats or Slovenes would generally be preferred to 
Serbs. However, in the case of the political class, the evidence shows that was not the case. 
Overall, there was virtually no mention of the different ethnicities in the various 
correspondences found within the archive, as all things and people are described simply as 
“Yugoslav”. The only ethnicity that was ever singled out in the documents were the Croats, 
who were only specifically mentioned by the German officials in the context of being a 
destabilizing force. This can be seen in the report of an official Yugoslavian complaint against 
the participation of exile-Croats in the 1977 Frankfurt book fair. In it, Dr. Finke-Osiander urges 
the foreign office to prepare to prevent any possible anti-Yugoslavian propaganda.7 The same 
 
4 Jaenicke, Bericht, Betreff: Deutsch-jugoslawisches Kulturabkommen und Zwei-jahresprogramm, 
aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Zwischenarchiv Band 116727, Zagreb 18. Januar 
1974, S. 2. 
5 Elinor M. Despalatovic, 'The Roots of the War in Croatia', in Joel M. Halpern, and David A. Kideckel, eds., 
Neighbours at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, Culture, and History, University Park 
(Pennsylvania) 2000, pp. 81-102 (p. 84). 
6 Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology, Notre Dame (Indiana) 1953, p. 50. 
7 Dr. Finke-Osiander, Bericht, Betreff: Jugoslawischer Protest gegen die Beteiligung exil-kroatischer Verlage 
an der diesjährigen Frankfurter Buchmesse, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, 
Zwischenarchiv Band 116731, Bonn 4. Oktober 1977, S. 2. 
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sentiment is expressed by Dr. Deutz, who goes a step further and suggests that the authorities 
should confiscate the exhibits if possible under German law.8 This comes to show that any past 
preferences the German political class may have had for the “Catholic ethnicities” of 
Yugoslavia were not relevant, as German actions seemed to be guided primarily by economic 
interest, as was demonstrated earlier; which also explains why no real effort was made to 
distinguish between the ethnicities, but a considerable amount of effort was put in appeasing 
the Yugoslav government. Another interesting example to be examined is a paper, written by a 
certain Conrad Behrendt, which critiques the establishment of the “Deutsch-jugoslawische 
Gesellschaft”.9 This paper was archived as an example of a far-right perspective on the matter, 
and indeed, the paper was littered with strong anti-communist and pro-Croat messages, which 
helps explain why the German political class were so quick to dismiss the Croat cause, as they 
grouped it together with the domestic far-right. This paper by Conrad Behrendt shows that the 
preference for Croats in Germany survived in certain forms. However, it was certainly not a 
part of the political establishment which primarily cared about trade, where such distinctions 
do not matter. 
It was already postulated that cultural relations between West Germany and Yugoslavia were 
not seen as important as the economic or scientific ones, as demonstrated by the document 
written by Jaenicke. The extent of the importance of these relations should nonetheless be 
examined. Puttkamer writes of the “Sonderolle” of Yugoslavia, which is more open to cultural 
exchange than the Eastern bloc countries. 10  This made Yugoslavia particularly important 
among the communist countries of Europe, as demonstrated by the fact that Dr. Barthold C. 
Witte writes concerning Yugoslavia and Romania, “Da dort unsere einzigen Kulturinstitute in 
Osteuropa liegen.“11 The importance of Yugoslavia specifically is further demonstrated in that 
of the three cities mentioned in the text (Belgrade, Zagreb, Bucharest), two are Yugoslavian. 
Indeed, the document shows ambition and the desire to increase cultural influence and 
interaction between the two countries. However, it is clear that German interests lie primarily 
 
8 Dr. Deutz, Bericht, Betreff: Jugoslawischer Protest gegen die Beteiligung exil-kroatischer Verlage an der 
diesjährigen Frankfurter Buchmesse, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Zwischenarchiv 
Band 116731, Bonn 5. Oktober 1977, S. 2. 
9 Conrad Behrendt, Papier, Betreff: Gründung einer „Deutsch-Jugoslawischen Gesellschaft“, aufbewahrt im 
Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Zwischenarchiv Band 116727, S. 1-6. 
10 Puttkamer, Bericht, Betreff:  Zweijahresprogramm Juni 1977 bis Juni 1979 zum deutsch-jugoslawischen 
Kulturabkommen, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Zwischenarchiv Band 116731, 
Belgrad 9. Mai 1977, S. 1. 
11 Dr. Barthold C. Witte, Bericht, Betreff: Verstärkung der kulturellen Präsenz der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland in Mittel- und Osteuropa, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, 
Zwischenarchiv Band 139459, Bonn 17. Dezember  1986, S. 2. 
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in expanding their influence, rather than obtaining anything of significance in the exchange. 
This is further mirrored in a 1987 document concerning the exchange of historians between the 
two countries, in which a German official Dr. Keipert estimates that “Die Zahl interessierter 
deutscher Historiker dürfte insgesamt gering sein.”12 Nonetheless, it is clear from the document 
that the Germans see this cooperation as positive and want it to continue. 
In conclusion, the West German officials were rather indifferent towards Yugoslavia in most 
regards, with their primary interests in the country being of the economic nature. The opinions 
they did hold appear to be mostly negative, with Yugoslavians seen as untrustworthy and naïve. 
The various ethnicities were seldom differentiated between, as ethnic differences were not 
beneficial to the economic relationship between the two countries; indeed, the Croat cause was 
ignored and even suppressed precisely because it posed a threat to trade. When it came to 
cultural policy the relative indifference towards Yugoslavia remained, and the cultural 
exchange was mostly pursued merely to increase German influence in Europe. Therefore, 
although Yugoslavia was important to West Germany both economically and culturally, West 
German officials did not perceive it very positively. 
 
The Yugoslavian perspective of the portrayal of guest workers in German media 
With the signing of the Labour Recruitment Agreement of 1968 between Germany and 
Yugoslavia, Germans’ exposure to Yugoslavia, its culture and its people went through an 
explosion, which led to a vast expansion in the cultural field and a boost in the socio-cultural 
activities between the two countries13. Through this agreement, Germany received a large 
quantity of Yugoslav guest workers, that helped create a new vision of the country and its 
traditions, which had generally been assigned a bad image in the West.  
The principal document in which this part of the research is based, was found in the Political 
Archive of the Auswärtiges Amt. It provides an insight on how Yugoslavian’s perceived 
German interest and its media. But also, how this interferes on a political level, due to the 
implication of a public institution such as the Auswärtiges Amt. The diplomatic trait of this 
labour agreement can be expressed perfectly through the words of political scientist Karen 
Schoenwaelder who said that ‘labor migration was never solely an economic affair; it was also 
an instrument of foreign policy’.14  
 
12 Dr. Keipert, Bericht, Betreff:  Sitzung der Gemischten deutsch-jugoslawischen Kultur-kommission im 
Frühjahr 1987, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 118 Band 483, Bonn 05.03.1987, S. 
1. 
13 Molnar, Imagining Yugoslavs: Migration and the Cold War in Postwar West Germany, p. 150 
14 Schönwälder, The Difficult Talk of Managing Migration, p. 260. 
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The first piece of this series of documents is a letter from the TV Production Company 
Tellux, which seek to film a documentary about a Yugoslav (Slovenian) guest worker in 
Germany, for which they also wished to film part of it with its family whose members apart 
from him all remained in Yugoslavia15. This first letter was addressed at the General Consulate 
of the Federal Republic of Germany in Zagreb. The TV Production company received the news 
from the Yugoslavian consulate in the FRG that they would not be given a visa to travel and 
film there. The producer, Mariana Rohrmoser, is asking the Consulate to help her in this matter, 
that relates very closely to diplomacy.  
After comings and goings between Zagreb & München, and between the diplomatic services, 
Tellux was granted a VISA. However, only for a day from the 29th of June until the 1st of July 
1977, and it was particularly stressed that the crew should present themselves with the local 
authorities on arrival and on departure1617. 
The information in this document being vague, still led to a lot of questions for this particular 
reason. Many queries came about while reading them which lead to a questioning of everything 
we know about Yugoslavia and connecting the dots of secondary literature with this primary 
source. The main question that one should ask oneself could be the following: Why was it so 
difficult to film a documentary there, particularly about this topic? This line of thought leads to 
the following sub-questions: Were the authorities scared that it could create a desire in its 
population to move to the West? Or that the system would be destabilized? Was this a simple 
move to restrict the freedom of speech of the guest worker’s wife? Or were they just scared of 
how they would be perceived and portrayed by West German’ media? Would they ‘suffer’ the 
same faith the GDR did? But most importantly, were Yugoslav authorities scared that their 
Nation would be portrayed as inferior to the West?  
These are all questions that are valid and represent a vision about Yugoslavia that has been 
perpetuated many times by the West. During the Cold War it was all about power, and 
appearances were of great importance, the media plays a large role in this matter so this answer 
by the consulate could be understood in this frame. The reason for this was the intense 
 
15 Marianne Rohrmoser, Brief, Betreff: Auftragsproduktion für den WDR “Ausländerfamilien”, aufbewahrt 
im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, ZA/ZW 116.731 (2365), München 1977. 
16 Generalkonsulat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Büronotiz, Betreff: Auftragsproduktion für den WDR 
“Ausländerfamilien”- Genehmigung für Dreharbeiten in Slowenien, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amtes, ZA/ZW 116.731 (2365), Zagreb 1977. 
17 Siegfried Opitz, Brief, Betreff: Auftragsproduktion für den WDR “Ausländerfamilien”- Genehmigung für 
Dreharbeiten in Slowenien, Bezug: Dortiges Schreiben vom 31.5.1977 sowie Ihr Telefongespräch mit Herr 
Lindemann und heutiges Fernschreiben, aufbewahrt   im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt, ZA/ZW 
116.731 (2365), Zagreb 1977. 
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politicisation of journalism. Most of the times, reporters from ‘enemy countries’ (in this case 
the West) were suspected of plotting and spying in collusion with diplomats and their national 
secret service, which many times led to responses like the one observed in this situation18. 
However, as it has been mentioned previously in this paper, in comparison to other Eastern-
Bloc countries Yugoslavia was relatively more open, probably due to its decision to remain 
neutral, but we can still see protectionism in comparison to the West.   
Nationalism also plays a central part, as it could be an equivalent to power. As a relatively 
newly founded nation formed by several nationalities pushing a unique national narrative 
Yugoslavia was being closely observed, and this interview could have damaged this. The risk-
potential was a big decisive factor, when taking decisions like this could be considered a 
conclusion. As it was stated previously, ethnic differences played a very important role in the 
country, and there is a constant push in all the documents to portray Yugoslavia as one nation 
without making a mention of the different ethnicities by the governmental institution19, and this 
particular situation is no exception. The idea of ‘Yugoslavism’ particularly in the area of culture 
was one that the government was very focused on exporting, to strengthen this idea of one 
nation in the diplomatic area.  It could be the case here, where the filming would only take place 
in Slovenia and focus on a Slovenian family and the programme would be broadcasted abroad, 
that it made the authorities uncomfortable. Also influenced by the fact that in Slovenia there 
was a big desire for independence, as it was later demonstrated in the independence referendum 
of 1990, where 95.71% of those eligible to vote, did so for Slovenia to become independent. 
As Maruša Pušnik explains in her work « Remembering Utopia. The culture of everyday life 
in Yugoslavia « 20, there was a desire in the Yugoslavian population in general for a better and 
wealthier life in general, inspired by the promising images of the West; and in relation to this a 
constant feeling of inferiority, which leads to the question of the refusal of a visa by the 
government being a response to not keep contributing to this feeling? The arrival of a camera 
crew from the West, could intensify this, maybe being more technological than what people 
from there had ever seen before. But most important in this matter were the questions that could 
be asked, the interviewed could feel inferior because maybe they were clueless about many of 
the asked subjects.  
By filming a show like the one proposed it would awaken a great deal of interest in society, 
particularly in the small community in which it was filmed. It could be argued by the 
 
18 Pedersen, Foreign Correspondents in the Cold War, p. 3. 
19 Hashi, The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Regional Disparities and the Nationalities Question, p.51. 
20 Pušnik, Remembering Utopia: the culture of everyday life in socialist Yugoslavia, p. 228. 
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Yugoslavian authorities, that interest in one could create a domino effect in which the curiosity 
for Western shows would grow and grow. For example, the massive penetration of television 
and particularly Western shows in Slovenian homes (1950-1980), had great consequences in 
socialist lives and the socialist system. Television has a great power to influence people’s lives, 
and therefore a power which the Yugoslavian government was not ready to give up so easily. 
In some way what this show represented was an alternative vision to socialist everyday life.  
It is hard to come up with one single specific answer to our question. But from the 
Yugoslavian perspective after reading on the topic, the only conclusion that can be reached is 
that there was great protectionism from the government to keep life isolated and unknown to 
outside powers, particularly from the West. It could be understood that it was due to the fear of 
feeling and seeming inferior, which could lead to losing morale. As it was explained previously 
also a fear that the great minds of the country could leave for the West when seeing the greater 
opportunities there.  
 
The German perspective of the mass emigration from Yugoslavia 
This section is about integration measures through pop culture or to be precise through TV 
shows from the German side. As seen before, Yugoslavia wanted to decide which image of 
Western countries was spread in their society. The Yugoslavian state couldn’t control the 
perception of the emigrants who left the country, that’s why in this abstract the mass emigration 
from the opposite side shall be analysed:  
How did WestvGermany react to the emigration in the field of integration? How did the 
mass emigration affect the relation between the two states? Which measures were taken to 
integrate the Yugoslavian guest-workers? Which role played the perception of the guest-
workers in the public field TV? 
From the beginning West Germany was the most important country for Yugoslavian 
emigration. In the 1950s and 60s a high quantity of Yugoslavian immigrants came to Germany 
either illegally or by applying for political asylum.21 By 1966 the number increased to 96.700 
Yugoslavs who were working in the Federal Republic. The actual number was probably much 
higher, since the official statistics counted only legal workers and didn’t include illegal migrants 
and family members.22  
 
21 Molnar, Memory, Politics, and Yugoslav Migrations to Postwar Germany, p. 89. 
22 Cf. ibid., p. 93. 
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Most people came due to economic reasons and were hoping to improve their financial 
situations. The emigration was favourable for both countries: The Yugoslavian labour market 
was relieved whereas the German labour market could grow.23  
In October 1968 both countries finally agreed on a contract which is formerly known as the 
Anwerbeabkommen. The labour recruitment treaty took effect in February 1969, at this time 
Yugoslavs were already the fourth largest group of immigrants in West Germany.24 After 
signing the contract there was another emigration boom which is considered as the “fourth 
phase of emigration” by Nikola Haberl.25  
After signing the treaty, the Federal Republic could finally start some integration measures 
on an official level. But at first, they didn’t make a lot of effort to do this as the German embassy 
in Belgrade was reporting to Bonn. The ambassador refers to two articles of the Yugoslavian 
daily newspapers “Politika” and “Borba'' which criticized the “als ungenügend bezeichneten 
Betreuungsmassnahmen (sic) der staatlichen Behörden und Gewerkschaften”.26 The articles 
further mention that the consulates which were established for the guest-workers were 
insufficient and too few. They also recognized a discrimination towards the Yugoslavian guest-
workers as the FRG refused to pay them financial support for their children, which lead to the 
presumption that the FRG saw Yugoslavian emigres primarily as a workforce.  
One integration attempt was made by the Referat V 6 of the department of state. On 
December 18th 1968 Dr. Meincke recorded that the Federal Minister of Labor and Social Order, 
Hans Katzer, wanted to create a TV show for Yugoslavian guest-workers which should be aired 
by the ARD. 
The chairman of the ARD, Christian Wallenreiter, was against it because: “(…) die 
jugoslawischen Arbeitnehmer könnten im Bundesgebiet ihre eigenen Sender hören.”27  
Yugoslavian migrants couldn’t watch Yugoslavian TV shows, but they could listen to radio 
shows which were receivable in West Germany.28  
 
23 Haberl, Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und 
Rückführung, p. 54. 
24 Molnar, Memory, Politics, and Yugoslav Migrations to Postwar Germany, p. 94. 
25 Haberl, Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und 
Rückführung, p. 50. 
26 Botschafter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Brief, Betreff: Jugoslawische Betreuungsmassnahmen [sic!] 
für die im Bundesgebiet tätigen Arbeitskräfte, aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 85, 
540.30 JUG, Bd. 2181, Belgrad 1969. 
27 Dr. Meincke, Vermerk, Betreff: Rundfunksendungen für jugoslawische Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland, 
aufbewahrt im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 85, 540.30 JUG, Bd. 2181, Bonn 1968. 
28 Haberl, Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und 
Rückführung, p. 141. 
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Dr. Meincke also mentioned in his note that the TV show could be causing trouble because 
it was done for the Spanish, Turkish, Greek and Italian guest-workers before and these had 
negative effects on the relations to the states. He is suggesting that they should carefully ask 
the Yugoslavian ambassador about his opinion on the shows. 
Two days later, on December 20th the Dg II A reflected on a note about a phone-call with 
Dr. Meincke. He was convinced that the TV show should be avoided because it was potentially 
trouble causing. He again reflects the bad experiences with other states and mentions further: 
“This annoyance should automatically increase in relation to the communist government of 
Yugoslavia. German radio stations cannot take over the broadcasts of Yugoslavian radio 
stations. If they are not taken over, but develop their own programs, this would have to be 
condemned by the Yugoslav government as an annoying influence.”29 
It seems they were assuming that the Yugoslavian state would presume the guest-workers 
could be integrated too much in German society. As mentioned in the first abstract of this paper 
German society was influenced by the fact that Yugoslavia had a communist regime which 
gave a negative picture of the people. 
The hypothesis that the political class was very cautious towards Yugoslavia seems validated 
with the careful and almost timid reaction the Auswärtiges Amt had to the idea of the TV show. 
Another fear of the Federal Republic is mentioned in another document. It’s a letter to the 
different resorts in the Auswärtige Amt and the final resolution against the TV show. In this 
letter Dr. Truckenbrodt speaks about the different ethnic groups from Yugoslavia. These groups 
are having conflicts with each other and he is afraid that the TV show would intensify the 
dispute. The conflicts he mentions are based on groups of radical Croatian separatist 
movements which were founded in West Germany in the late 1950s.30  
Their biggest attack was the bombing of the Yugoslav Trade Mission in Bonn in November 
1962.31 Nikola Haberl is also speaking about mafia structures when emigres, in this case more 
likely refugees who had no official status in Germany, were forced to pay money to these groups 
so they could stay.32 
 
29 Original Zitat: “Dieser Ärger müsste sich automatisch im Verhältnis zur kommunistischen Regierung 
Jugoslawiens noch potenzieren. Deutsche Rundfunkanstalten können nicht die Sendungen jugoslawischer 
Rundfunkanstalten übernehmen. Werden sie nicht übernommen, sondern eigene Sendungen ausgearbeitet, müßte 
(sic!) dies von der jugoslawischen Regierung als lästige Beeinflussung verurteilt werden.“ in: Dg II A, 
Aktennotiz, Betreff: Rundfunksendungen für jugoslawische Arbeitnehmer in Deutschland, aufbewahrt im 
Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 85, 540.30 JUG, Bd. 2181, Bonn 1969. 
30 Molnar, Memory, Politics, and Yugoslav Migrations to Postwar Germany, p. 65.  
31 Cf. ibid., p. 67. 
32 Haberl, Die Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften zur Problematik ihrer Auslandsbeschäftigung und 
Rückführung, p. 119. 
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It seems that the conflicts of the different ethnic groups which led to the Yugoslavian Wars 
in the 1990s and began to become visible in the 1980s already began to become visible in the 
FRG before. Germany didn’t know about the intensity and the consequences of where these 
conflicts would lead to - and so it seems that they tried to stay neutral in the series of conflicts. 
Maybe because they didn’t know how to react and didn’t want to make it worse, they declined 
the TV shows.  
The letter also shows somewhat of an ignorant attitude towards the different ethnicities as 
they only mention the Croats. As explained in the first abstract of this paper this seems to be 
based on the strong anti-Yugoslavian and pro-Croat groups which existed in Germany. The fact 
that they didn’t try to appease the situation could be based on economic interest or due to the 
fact that both governments were intending for the Yugoslavian guest-workers to return home 
after a specific period of time. 
It seems that this attitude changed during the time because information centres for guest-
workers were established in 1973. They weren't led by a state-run organisation, the 
Arbeiterwohlfahrt was responsible for them. 
As a final hypothesis one could say that the FRG had a very cautious attitude towards the 
Yugoslavian guest-workers. They didn’t want to intervene too much as they were afraid of the 
Yugoslavian reaction. The precarious attitude seems to be based on the communist regime and 
the uncertainty on how to interact to it during the time of the Cold War.    
 
Conclusion 
Until now, the topic of Yugoslavian guest workers has formed a blank space in historical 
research, which is why it is very difficult to make generalizing statements. This paper tries to 
give first answers and an overview for future research. 
Within this research the general perception of Yugoslavs in West Germany was analysed 
through the prism of television; this field was particularly relevant during the 1960s and 1970s 
due to the great influx of Yugoslavian guest workers into Germany. Using this and other 
archival evidence, a new light was shed on the cultural relations between the two countries.  
As it has been demonstrated throughout this paper, there was fear and distrust from both 
parties. This is a typical trait of the Cold War setting, despite Yugoslavia officially being non-
aligned. From the Yugoslavian perspective it was obvious that protecting their society and 
ideology was a priority, to which the West German way of life was a threat. In relation to this, 
it is no surprise that German officials were cautious not to endanger diplomatic relations by 
interfering in matters that were strongly vinculated to delicate topics in Yugoslavian society.  
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The new communist Yugoslav state that emerged after the Second World War had to contend 
with the legacy of the bloody conflict. The experience of the war in Yugoslavia was complicated 
and violent, with multiple groups involved, often leaving destruction in their wake. Stanley 
Payne describes the war as “Three distinct civil wars and one international conflict, waged both 
consecutively and simultaneously.”1 The eventual victory of the communist partisans led by 
Tito allowed for the recreation of a Yugoslav state after the war with a philosophy of 
communism independent of Stalinism. However, this did not bely the loss of life, or the 
traumatic memories.  
After the Second World War, both West Germany (FRG) and Yugoslavia (SFRY) were left 
to contend with the complicated memory of the war. On both sides, political questions of 
commemoration and remembrance became part of separate national narratives of perpetration 
and victimhood. These narratives came into contact with each other in the difficult matters of 
commemorative parades, holidays, and war cemeteries. Much of the scholarship on the 
Yugoslav portrayal of the war has focused on the dominant narrative of the Yugoslav state. The 
predominant narrative of the Yugoslav government concerning the Second World War was that 
the communist partisans triumphed over fascism.2 .  
These overarching narratives of the war also came into conflict with the personal memories 
of people who had lost family members in the war. The past can be interpreted through a variety 
of lenses, and each is grounded in a fundamentally different usage of the past, with different 
purposes. The version of the past presented in the narrative of a state is not the same as that 
passed through the stories of families. Different historical actors each have their own view of 
the past; an individual is guided by their personal memory, and states are driven by maintaining 
narrative. Within the realm of diplomatic relations, personal memories of individuals created 
tension with the official narrative of the states involved because their understanding of the past 
is different. 
 
1 Payne, Stanley G., A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), p. 409. 
2 Karge, Heike, “Mediated remembrance: local practices of remembering the Second World War” in: Tito's 
Yugoslavia, European Review of History—Revue européenne d’histoire (Feb, 2009), p. 50. 
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The case of war graves provides a case study where many actors interact and demonstrate 
their own interpretation of a site of memory. Sites of memory provide the best subject to discuss 
contested ideas of the past, because they create a concrete place for the overlap of memory and 
narrative. The definition of sites of memory according to Jay Winters, is, “physical sites where 
commemoration takes place.”1 Graveyards are an interesting example, because they combine 
personal mourning with, in the case of war cemeteries, the national narrative.2 Because of this, 
a multi-layered approach that includes many actors is the most effective. As Winters argues, 
“Decentering the history of commemoration ensures that we recognize the regional, local, and 
idiosyncratic character of such activities and the way a top-down approach must be 
supplemented by a bottom-up approach.”3 This article will take an approach that examines both 
governmental narrative and the generational memory of individuals, which will demonstrate 
the layered nature of issues like war graves and public commemoration. 
The period of this analysis will be the 1970s, because this was the period when there was the 
strongest pressure to commemorate the war. As Eelco Runia claims, what he terms the “excess 
of memory” created by  generation memory was the primary motivation for the wave of 
commemoration that happened in the 1970s.4 He claims that, “The recent desire upsurge in the 
“desire to  commemorate" can be pinpointed rather exactly: it started in the mid-1970s.”5  As 
he states, the key force in the 1970s was, “the transformation of the memory of those who 
actually witnessed a conflagration into a commemorative response of their descendants.”6 For 
this reason, the focus of this analysis  will be on the period of the 1970s. This period saw the 
negotiation of commemoration between actors that represented generational and governmental 
actors who acted to protect narrative. 
Through the diplomatic correspondences that passed through the embassy in Belgrade and 
the letters received by the embassy, it is possible to see each set of actors in the complicated 
question of personal and national remembrance. It is possible to see the tensions between the 
political narratives of two post-war states, and the tension between personal commemoration 
and political narratives. By employing a methodology that handles memory on different levels 
 
1 Winters, Jay, “Sites of Memory”, in: Radstone, Susannah, Schwartz, Bill (ed.), Memory: Histories, 
Theories, Debates, (Fordham University, 2010), p. 312. 
2 Tzortzopoulou-Gregory, Lita, “Remembering and Forgetting: The Relationship Between Memory and the 
Abandonment of Graves in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Greek Cemeteries”, in: International Journal of 
Historical Archaeology, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June, 2010), p. 286. 
3 Winters, Sites of Memory, p. 317. 
4 Runia, Eeelco, “Burying the Dead, Creating the Past”, in: History and Theory, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Oct., 2007), 
p. 322. 
5  Runia, p. 320. 
6  Runia, p. 320. 
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it is possible to address the question of how personal grief can become entangled in the 
negotiation of national narrative between two different countries. 
This analysis will provide another perspective by including new actors outside of the 
Yugoslav government. This will include three different sets of actors, and their own 
interpretation of the issues. The first section will deal with the personal and generational 
memories of individuals through their letters to the embassy. The second section will discuss 
the correspondence of German intermediary organizations. The role of intermediary 
organizations, which will be the linchpin of this analysis is to bridge the gap between the state 
and the individual. This section will present both the German and Yugoslav sides of the issue, 
and the points of disagreement between them. The final section will present the narratives of 
both governments through correspondence between diplomats. Together, they will demonstrate 
that personal memory and state narratives were often in conflict, and intermediary organizations 
were necessary to arrange commemoration. 
  
Memory as Expressed in Letters from Individuals 
This section will deal with three examples of personal letters that were sent to the consulate 
concerning war graves. They consist of one letter exchange with Fritz Heim that contains three 
letters sent in November of 1976 and March of 1977, and a letter from Hans Eberhard Klughardt 
from the 21st of October 1971. The documents from other organizations like the “Verein 
deutscher Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V” indicate that there were many other such letters. 7 
However, these are the letters that are preserved in the archive of the embassy in Belgrade. For 
this reason, they can be treated as examples of the way that people expressed their personal 
desire to mourn, and not as an exceptional few. The way that they express their grievances is 
an indication of the role of personal memory in the question of war graves. The desire to 
commemorate comes from their familial connections, and they frame their request in terms of 
the personal instead of the political, because the matter is not political to them on a personal 
level. 
The letters from individuals are driven by generational memory, so it is necessary to define 
both kinds of memory. Personal memory can only really be created by the direct experience of 
an individual.8 It is the direct result of an individual being involved in historical developments. 
In this respect, memory is not constructed, because it is built from experience. However, as van 
Vree argues, it can also be impacted by predominant narratives. The human memory is not 
 
7 Müller, R., Deutscher Kriegsgräber in Tekija, PA AA, BELG, RK 655.00 
8 van Vree, Frank, “Absent memories”, in: Cultural Analysis Vol. 12 (2013), p. 2. 
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entirely static, and memories can be impacted by the conditions around a person.9 Memories 
can be “absent” or “frozen” in the sense that they never are expressed because of the pressure 
of the dominant narrative. In this case, those who directly experienced the war, like former 
soldiers may not be able to express their own memory because of the state narrative. So, it may 
take a generation for memory to be expressed. 
Generational memory10 is a different understanding of the past drawn from the either direct 
retelling of the past from a relative, or the experience of imagining the experience of relatives. 
Marianne Hirsh defines the same concept- which she calls “postmemory” - as, “the relationship 
that the generation after those who witnessed cultural or collective trauma bears to the 
experiences of those who came before, experiences that they “remember” only by means of… 
stories, images, and behaviors”11 Her definition stresses the emotional impact of this kind of 
inherited memory. As she states, generational memory, “approximates memory in its affective 
force.”12 This emotional investment leads to a desire to commemorate the experience of the 
past generation. 
Both sets of letters are motivated by familial connections, which corresponds to the idea that 
the desire to commemorate is driven by generational connections. The case of Fritz Heim is 
very clear in this respect. He is writing to find a grave site where he can mourn his father.13 
This fits into the theory that traumatic experience is passed from one generation, to the next 
that mourns it. The case of Hans Klinghardt is a bit more complicated, since he is asking about 
the grave location of his brother-in-law. His brother-in-law, Dr. Martin Speer, was soldier in 
Greece during the war, and was a prisoner of war in Yugoslavia after the war. Dr. Speer died 
in a prison camp in Yugoslavia and was buried somewhere near it. According to Klinghardt, 
there was a delay in him and his wife being informed about the death. Once they were informed, 
they began a trip to Yugoslavia to find where he could be buried.14 This presents a slightly more 
complicated idea of the inheritance of memory. It is not being passed directly from one 
generation to another. The sister in this case inherited the memory of her brother. However, 
since it is the imagined experience of a relative, it still fits the definition of generational 
memory. Klinghardt also provides a demonstration of how knowledge is passed. He states his 
 
9 Ibidem, p. 4. 
10 Sometimes also called postmemory, but I am choosing to use generational memory to keep terminology 
consistent. 
11 Hirsch, Marianne, “The Generation of Postmemory” in: Poetics Today Vol. 29, (2008), p. 106. 
12 Ibidem, p. 109. 
13 Heim, Fritz, Letter from Fritz Heim to the Embassy, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 17.688. 
14 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 1. 
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brother-in-law’s history in specific detail, though he only knows it through his brother-in-law’s 
comrades.15 Thus, the memory in this case was created by imagining the person’s experience 
through the stories of others. In both cases, generational memory is the primary motivation for 
them to seek to commemorate their relatives. 
Both letters view commemoration as non-political, and state that their own desire is not 
political.  Fritz Heim’s letter is short, and he states that he only wants to know if there is a 
gravesite that he can visit. He says that “this should be possible from Belgrade with a telephone 
call to the site.”16 He clearly views the issue as uncomplicated and does not imagine that there 
is a political dimension to discussing the graves of German soldiers in Yugoslavia. Hans 
Klinghardt’s letter shows a greater understanding of strained political relations between 
Germany and Yugoslavia, likely informed by his own experience of trying to communicate 
with Yugoslav authorities. He details his experience of traveling to the SFRY with his wife and 
being told first that his brother-in-law was buried in “Vrsac, Soldatenfriedhof, Parzelle D, Grab 
187.”17 However, when he inquired at the municipal government in Vrsac, he was told that 
there was no gravesite, and that the authorities could not aid him in finding one. He tells the 
story of finding an old resident of Vrasc who told them where the former prisoner-of-war camp 
was located. From this frustration, he assumes that the Yugoslav government does not want to 
admit to killing German prisoners-of-war. 18  So, he understands that there is a political 
dimension to this issue and it is not simply a matter of finding a grave. However, he still views 
it as an issue of commemoration. He makes the comparison of gravesites for concentration 
camps, which he says were created for remembrance. He says that there should be reciprocal 
remembrance.19 He believes that it should be the same for a Yugoslav prisoner of war camp. 
This indicates that he fundamentally views this as a question of commemoration, not one of 
politics. 
The existence of these letters, and the frustration that they express highlight the needs for 
intermediary organizations, because individuals are unable to negotiate with Yugoslav 
authorities on their own. Klinghardt’s letter demonstrates this, because he details how he 
 
15 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 2. 
16 Heim, Fritz, Letter from Fritz Heim to the Foreign Minister, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 17.688, 
translated by author. 
17 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 2. 
18 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 2. 
19 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 2. 
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initially tried to direct his inquiries to the Yugoslav authorities.20 He was met with either 
frustration or denial, so he is appealing to the German consulate. He also says that he is writing 
to the Yugoslav embassy with this issue, but that he believes that he will need the support of 
the German embassy as well.21 This letter demonstrates that it was necessary to appeal to those 
with more authority to act as intermediaries. 
 
Organisations as Intermediates between Governments and Individuals 
This section is dedicated to specialised organisations such as the “Verein deutscher 
Kriegsgräberfürsorge e.V”. (VdK) on the West German side. Fortunately, there is a wealth of 
documents about correspondences between these organisations and embassies. Contrary to the 
previous section, the organisations pursue a certain goal with their actions, that cannot be 
reduced to personal interest. This goal can but does not have to be political. In many cases we 
can see such organisations as the VdK working as intermediaries between individuals, seeking 
to personally commemorate their own loved ones, and governments trying to maintain their 
politically charged commemorative practices and narratives of the Second World War. This 
makes the correspondence found from these organisations especially useful in demonstrating 
the conflict between the personal and the political when it comes to WWII memory and 
commemoration. This can be seen in much of the communication between the VdK and the 
Yugoslavian government, often through the West German embassy in Belgrade, on the issue of 
German war graves in Yugoslavia. The FRG organisation argues this to be an issue of personal 
commemoration for individuals with deceased loved ones in the SFRY and more broadly a 
humanitarian issue on the treatment of the war dead. Whereas the Yugoslavian side saw this 
issue as more political: war graves forming part of a wider narrative on the Yugoslav experience 
of WWII and the contemporary issues faced by the post-war Communist state.   
 
The West German perspective 
In this section, the West German perspective on the situation of war graves in Yugoslavia will 
be discussed. Therefore, to create this perspective, certain documents from the Politisches 
Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts were analysed and certain sections displaying opinions were 
extracted. Over 200 pages of documents about the topic of war graves from World War II were 
 
20 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 2. 
21 Klinghardt, Hans Eberhard, Letter from Hans Eberhard Klinghardt, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Amt, 
17.688, p. 3. 
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able to provide an approximate overview. How representative the selection of the conserved 
information is, has to be at least briefly reflected in the preliminary considerations. Since the 
sources were derived from a German archive, this immediately suggests two things: Firstly, 
that opinions (which were preserved) might tend to favour the West German narrative. And 
secondly, that the decision about the preservation of documents was determined by the West 
German side. Against this stands the richness of sources to be found in the archive which by 
contrast suggests that the sample of sources was not highly selective. 
Contextually, there are three major points to be made in this chapter: Firstly, that West 
German officials believe the question of war graves to be non-political, but rather a personal 
issue concerning personal mourning. To this statement, a conversation between two ministers 
can be addressed. Both are discussing the topic of how political war graves are and how to 
prospectively proceed with this issue. The document itself is a translation from advisor Dr. 
Seibert from 23rd June 1971 of a conversation between SFRY foreign minister Mirko Tepavac 
and FRG foreign minister Walter Scheel that took place on November 26th 1970 in Belgrade.22 
In this special case, Tepavac responds to Scheel that he thinks the question of German war 
graves in Yugoslavia should be unrelated to political relations between the two countries. He 
mentions that he addressed the same remarks to West German Chancellor (also referred to as 
Bundeskanzler) Willy Brandt before. Hereafter, he then contradicts his current statement by 
connecting the issue of German war graves in Yugoslavia to the payment of reparations for 
national-socialist crimes on Yugoslavian ground. Summarised, Tepavac states: “German war 
graves do not have to be directly related to the question of reparations for Yugoslavian victims, 
although, as long as the issue of reparations stays unresolved, there cannot be a solution to the 
question of war graves either.”23Few quotations are able to present the torn position West 
German officials were confronted with more vividly. 
Secondly, West German opinion is that the matter of war graves relates to humanitarian 
issues. Proof for this argument is provided by a report concerning a meeting between the former 
West German ambassador in Yugoslavia, Garov Altman, and Prof. Dr. Willi Thiele, who served 
the VdK as president from 1970 to 78. During the conversation, Thiele states that caretaking 
for war graves is a humanitarian way to conduce peace. The talks themselves took place on 14th 
 
22 Dr. Seibert, Anlage zum Bericht der Botschaft Belgrad Nr. 571/71 vom 29.6.1971 - IV 3-85.00, PA AA, 
AV Neues Archiv, 17.688. 
23 Dr. Seibert, Anlage zum Bericht der Botschaft Belgrad Nr. 571/71 vom 29.6.1971 - IV 3-85.00, PA AA, 
AV Neues Archiv, 17.688; the original text is "Diese Frage müsse auch nicht direkt mit der Frage der 
Entschädigung jugoslawischer Opfer nazistischer Verfolgungen verbunden werden, wenn auch, solange die 
Frage der Entschädigung ungelöst sei, die Frage der Pflege der Gräber nicht gelöst werden könne."German 
translation by author. 
COMMENMORATION OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
37 
of September 1977 as Bundeskanzler Schmidt and Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito 
reportedly agreed upon beforehand. 24  Gavro Altman has been entrusted with the task to 
coordinate the issue of German war graves in Yugoslavia. On one side, Thiele explicitly stresses 
that war graves are a humanitarian issue. On the contrary, an employee of the foreign ministry 
is reported to repeat reservations against a Yugoslavian support in the matter. The reasons are 
cited as “emigre-terrorism, ‘Neo-Nazism’ and guest-worker issues.”25 Henceforth, Altman is 
noted to be embarrassed by the remarks of the ministry employee. This document proves that 
there certainly were reservations held against the plans from Yugoslavian side, since the foreign 
ministry employee is cited to only restate previously mentioned arguments. Unfortunately, the 
time, place and person stating the remarks in the first place are not evident from the analysed 
documents. Nevertheless, this report illustrates the two corresponding sides and their respective 
views on the matter and is also able to provide an insight into argumentation structures. 
The third major point to be made in this section relates to the issue of war graves providing 
a possibility for reconciliation between the two countries. Thus, this can for example be seen in 
a letter sent from West German ambassador Horst Grabert, who is Altman’s successor, to the 
president of the VdK, Dr. Josef Schneeberger, in which he refers to a conversation between the 
FRG’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Josip Vrhovec about war graves as sites 
of reconciliation. The letter is an answer to a previous letter from Schneeberger. In the reply 
from 13th August 1980, Grabert is able to provide two important levels of information. Firstly, 
ambassador Grabert is assuring president Schneeberger of his help and support concerning the 
matter of war graves. And secondly, he expresses his happiness about a success in their efforts: 
Foreign minister Genscher himself laid a wreath to mourn the war dead at Serbian soldier’s 
graveyard Banovo Brdo and stressed the importance of the issue.26 Thereby, the influence of 
the organisational level, here through the VdK, on the state-political level can be illustrated. 
Similarly, the VdK promoted an agreement with first the Soviet Union and later Russia about 
the graves of German soldiers on their territory. However, negotiations with the USSR started 
only during the late 1980s and therefore, more than ten years after the research period for this 
paper. 27  Anyway, it is important to bear in mind that the VdK did not only work with 
 
24 Hofmann, Fernschreiben (verschlüsselt) an 513, PA AA, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688. 
25 Hofmann, Fernschreiben (verschlüsselt) an 513, PA AA, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688; the original text is in 
German, translation by author. 
26 Grabert, Horst, No title, PA AA, BELG, RK 655.20. 
27 Compare: Siegl, Elfie, „Versöhnung über Gräbern, Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge in Russland“, in: 
Osteuropa 58 Jg. 6 (2008), p. 308f. 
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Yugoslavia, but rather pursued the goal of advancing the general issue of German war graves 
from the World Wars following their motto “rapprochement – reconciliation – peace.”28 
As for the state political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, the overall policy 
underwent certain changes during the time period of the 1970s. Important to mention are the 
two Bundeskanzlers Willy Brandt (1969 to 1974) and Helmut Schmidt (1974 to 1982). Both 
have been mentioned before and are surely highly involved in the shaping of West Germany’s 
state level politics. Kaya Shonick expresses a thesis about Brandt: He, when he used to be 
minister of foreign affairs, took a leading role in the forging of the guest-worker agreement 
between the FRG and SFRY in 1968 to aid peace and reconciliation between the two 
countries.29 During his tenure as Bundeskanzler, Brandt promoted a new eastern policy called 
Neue Ostpolitik which favoured a friendly approach towards countries in the East. 30  The 
changes which the years of social democratic reign in West Germany brought, enhanced the 
chances of state officials to make public appearances in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the fact that 
all the West German state officials cited from the documents so far in this part are either 
members of Brandt’s or Schmidt’s cabinets, supports the importance of the new approaches 
introduced by them. 
Thus, adding to the wider picture of West German politics: Also, regarding the relationship 
between the FRG and Yugoslavia certain developments can be observed. In the documents 
several mentions are made about the relations between the two countries. Chronologically, the 
first mention of this topic to be found in the given documents is made in January 1976.31 In that 
respect, the ties between the FRG and Yugoslavia are mentioned to have normalised. Following 
this, a letter from October 1979 reports that talks about German war graves in Yugoslavia have 
been abandoned due to worsening relations, the author assumes.32 A source from about the year 
1983 refers to the relationship as improved.33 Eventually, these excerpts of opinions and reports 
can only certainly prove that first and foremost, circumstances changed over time and were 
neither constantly bad nor good and additionally, that the changes influenced the issue of war 
graves by bettering or lowering the chances of bilateral exchange. Moreover, economic factors 
might have played a role in the developments since West Germany’s economic growth 
 
28 Ibidem, p. 309. 
29 Shonick, Kaja, “Politics, Culture and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement 
with Yugoslavia”, in: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct. 2009), p. 719. 
30 Compare: Götemaker, Manfred, “Entspannung und Neue Ostpolitik 1969-1975”, available at: 
https://www.bpb.de/izpb/10344/entspannung-und-neue-ostpolitik-1969-1975 [last accessed 09.02.2020]. 
31 Krah, Kriegsopferversorgung für Jugoslawien, PA AA, BELG, RK 544.01 
32 Neumann, Hans Günter, No title, PA AA, BELG, RK 655.00 
33Unknown author, Beziehungen Jugoslawien - BRD, PA AA, MfAA ZR, 742/87; the document refers to one 
of Bundespräsident Karl Carstens’ visits to Yugoslavia which took place in September 1983. 
COMMENMORATION OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
39 
stagnated in the early 1970s for the first time in the post-war era.34 The documents are also able 
to provide an insight by stating the wish from West German side to send about 320.000 guest-
workers back to the SFRY to relax the situation in the FRG. 35  Ultimately, these new 
developments only underline the prior point about state politics affecting the relations between 
West Germany and Yugoslavia. 
Unfortunately, disagreement in the aforementioned assumptions leads to frustration 
regarding the question of German war graves on Yugoslavian ground, especially on the West 
German side. The apolitical perception was not echoed by Yugoslavian officials and therefore, 
conflicts arose. 
 
The Yugoslav perspective  
The next section will contrast the West German perspective with the Yugoslav stance on the 
issue of war graves. Investigating this topic through the archival material of the Auswärtiges 
Amt means that the Yugoslav perspective can only be interpreted through their dealings with 
West German organisations and embassies. This does not account for variations and 
inconsistencies in the Yugoslav perspective on the Second World War, their memories or 
commemoration of it. Nevertheless, much of the Yugoslav government’s official stance on 
WWII commemoration can be ascertained from their response to the question of war graves. 
Firstly, it is clear that the Yugoslav sides view the issue of war graves is far more political 
than the West Germans, most notably Professor Willi Thiele, argues it to be. This disagreement 
can be found in subtle places in their communication, even on the West German side, on why 
the question of German war graves is complicated in Yugoslavia. Documents of 
correspondence between the German Embassy in Belgrade and Bonn consistently note the 
‘psychological barriers’ or ‘stress’ in Yugoslavia when it comes to the question of war graves, 
often meaning that the issue must be handled delicately and gradually.36 There is also an 
example in which the case of German war graves in Yugoslavia is compared with Yugoslav 
war graves in Germany - an attempt on the German side to remove the issue from national 
 
34 Compare: Möller, Horst, „Die 1970er Jahre als zeithistorische Epochenschwelle“, in: Gotto, Bernhard, 
Möller Horst, Mondot, Jean, Pelletier, Nicole (ed.), Nach „Achtundsechzig“, Krisen und Krisenbewusstsein in 
Deutschland und Frankreich in den 1970er Jahren, München 2013, 1. Auflage, p. 2f; Pleinen, Jenny, „Die 
bundesrepublikanische Migrationsgeschichte der „langen“ 1970er Jahre“, in: Dietrich, Tobias, Zey-Wortmann, 
Katharina (ed.), Die 1970er Jahre in Geschichtswissenschaft und Unterricht, Frankfurt am Main 2012, 1. 
Auflage, p.78ff. 
35 Unknown author, Beziehungen Jugoslawien - BRD, PA AA, MfAA ZR, 742/87; Caution: The source 
refers to the early 1980s. 
36 W. Hofmann, “Kriegsgräber in Jugoslawien,” 25.04.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688; 
Puttkammer, “Kriegsgräber in Jugoslawien,” 17.05.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688; 
Puttkammer, “Kriegsgräber in Jugoslawien,” 25.05.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688. 
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narratives of WWII and make it objective, apolitical and about all the war-dead. This, the 
Yugoslav official UStS Bernadić argues is not an acceptable comparison, as those buried in 
Germany are ‘victims of fascism’, denoting a higher moral status to those ‘victims’ than the 
Germans buried in Yugoslavia (the implied perpetrators).37 Bernadić defends the importance of 
the historical context of these deaths from German attempts to de-politise the issue because 
German war graves remained significant to Yugoslavia’s post-war narratives of fascism and 
victimhood. 
The issue of fascism was raised by the Yugoslav side on more occasions. In the Stenographic 
report of a meeting which took place on 14th September 1977 between Professor Thiele and 
Yugoslavian functionaries, namely Garov Altman, the Yugoslav officials highlight the wider 
political implications of the issue of war graves for the Yugoslav government. Ljubo Jovanovic 
notes instances of ‘resurrected elements or remnants of fascism’ in West Germany which they 
see as a hindrance to the relationship between the two nations.38 For the Yugoslav side to raise 
the issue of contemporary fascism and terrorism in West Germany during a meeting to discuss 
German war graves demonstrates the discord between their perspectives. The personal 
commemoration of West Germans came into conflict with the Yugoslav government policy on 
WWII commemoration and their narrative on fascism both during the Second World War and 
after. For the Yugoslav government German war graves were considered part of the wider 
contemporary political issues between their nations. It is important to note that Garov Altman 
does agree with Professor Thiele during their meeting that the commemoration of the war-dead 
is indeed a humanitarian issue, even noting the Geneva Convention, but maintains that the 
‘character’ of the Second World War cannot be forgotten39. 
Due to the ‘psychological’ factor of WWII memory in Yugoslavia and the importance of 
WWII commemorative policy for the Yugoslav government, a key restriction Garov Altman 
and other Yugoslav functionaries insisted on was confidentiality and discretion. They often 
insisted that tackling the issue of German war graves should be done gradually, emphasising 
the importance of ‘small steps.’ 40  This attitude was understood and echoed by the West 
Germans. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt even emphasised the importance of caution and a gradual 
approach to Prof. Thiele before the 14th September meeting.41 This is most likely due to fears 
 
37 Puttkammer, “Kriegsgräber in Jugoslawien,” 25.05.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688, p. 2. 
38 Stenographic Record, 14.09.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688, p. 28. 
39 Stenographic Record, 14.09.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688, p. 19-20. 
40 Stenographic Record, 14.09.1977, PA AA, BELG, AV Neues Archiv, 17.688, p. 20. 
41 Helmut Schmidt, “Letter from Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to Professor Willi Thiele,” 01.07.1977, PA AA, 
AV Neues Archiv, 17.688. 
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on the Yugoslav side of a negative reaction to the remembrance of the German war-dead, as a 
contentious issue in Yugoslavia. Such work could interfere with the Yugoslav policy of WWII 
commemoration, their historical narrative of the Second World War and their national narrative 
of fascism altogether. 
As stated previously, the Yugoslav perspective on WWII commemoration cannot wholly be 
interpreted from these documents. The nature of archival material at the Auswärtiges Amt 
means only the Yugoslav government’s response to the question of war graves can be analysed 
to investigate their wider policy of WWII commemoration. The historian Heike Karge has 
researched some of the discrepancies between local WWII commemoration in Yugoslavia and 
the official state policy, criticising the traditional historiography of a ‘frozen’ narrative of the 
Second World War in Yugoslavia.42 Therefore, it is important to refute the idea of a singular 
narrative of the Second World War amongst the people of Yugoslavia or in its commemoration. 
But the Yugoslav government did promote a nationalising, singular policy of WWII 
commemoration across Yugoslavia. Whether or not this was successful in enforcing a shared 
memory of the Second World War, the nature of this policy, as deeply political and contentious 
for the Yugoslav government, is evident in these documents. 
 
Inter-government communication and national narratives 
This section will deal with the national narratives of each government, and how they appear in 
diplomatic inter-governmental correspondence. Therefore, it is necessary to define narrative. 
Narrative refers to the version of the past created and reproduced by governments with the goal 
of creating a unified version of the past.  This process involves taking pieces of the past and 
creating a story that resonated with the vision of the state that serves the government. As stated 
by Pierre Nora, “Representation proceeds by strategic highlighting, selecting samples, and 
multiplying examples.”43 It is necessary when creating any kind of representation of the past to 
focus on certain events as examples. However, in the case of governmental presentations, the 
selection is deliberate and in service of the politics of the present. Lowenthal defines the process 
specifically as upgrading the past, selectively forgetting, and contriving genealogy.44 These 
processes forget that which is uncomfortable to the present and highlight events or figures that 
 
42 Karge, Heike, “Mediated remembrance: local practices of remembering the Second World War in Tito's 
Yugoslavia”, European Review of History—Revue européenne d'histoire (2009), 16:1, 49-62, DOI: 
10.1080/13507480802655394. 
43 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, in: Representations, No. 26, Special 
Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring, 1989), p. 17. 
44 Lowenthal, David, “Fabricating heritage”, in: History & Memory, Volume 10, Number 1 (Spring 1998), p. 
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demonstrate the virtue of the shared heritage. As Lowenthal states, “Celebrating some bits and 
forgetting others, heritage reshapes a past made easy to embrace.” 45 Importantly, narrative 
itself is not static. It serves the need of current political goals. For this analysis, diplomats and 
ministers are the primary actors involved in the production of narrative, because they are 
responsible for acting on the interests of the state. 
The Second World War also played a notable role in the communications between the 
governments of the post-war societies when they deal with matters not concerning war graves, 
although it is often not immediately obvious. Similar to the war graves, the national narratives 
that the respective governments try to advance play a key role in this subject.  
In the immediate communication between the governments of West Germany and 
Yugoslavia, the topic of the world war was largely omitted. However, choosing to avoid talking 
about an issue is also portraying a way to deal with it. The reason for the omission is that 
government individuals do not show their personal opinion towards the persons that they 
communicate with because they write on behalf of their governments and by extension also the 
narratives of their countries. Almost all of the government officials and politicians that dealt 
with each other in the timeframe observed in this paper had some kind of war-background. 
Although no evidence for previous encounters could be found, this means that essentially, 
former wartime enemies are now treating with each other on the diplomatic battlefields. Most 
of them were soldiers, some played other roles, such as jurists.  
A few noteworthy examples are Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski, who was a politician of the 
German social democratic party (SPD) since 1946 and played an important role in the liberation 
of the hostages taken by the leftist German terrorist group Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in 
Mogadishu.46 From 1974 to 1976 he was minister of state of the Federal Foreign Office of the 
FRG. For his efforts, he has received the order of the Yugoslavian Star with Golden Wreath, 
which is the 14th highest decoration that the SFRY could award.47 He received this for notable 
contribution to understanding and all-around cooperation between the SFRY and the FRG.48 In 
the Second World War, H.J. Wischnewski was Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) of the 
Panzergrenadiers (armoured infantry, a highly prestigious branch of the German army49). He 
 
45 Ibidem, p. 13. 
46 A newspaper article by the FAZ from 2005, when Wischnewski died: Unknown author, “Der “Held von 
Mogadischu “ist tot”, available at: https://www.faz.net/-gpf-px1b [last accessed 11.02.2020]. 
47  There is a list of Yugoslavian decorations accessible here: 
http://www.sammler.ru/database/index.php?cat=407. 
48 Verbalnote, PA AA, BELG, Prot 704, 317/77. 
49  Kirchubel, Robert, Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of Soviet Russia (2013), Bloomsbury 
Publishing, p. 69. 
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has received the Iron Cross first class and the wound badge for his service50, so he could be 
considered a German war hero. On the Yugoslavian side is Boris Snuderl. He was the president 
of the German-Yugoslavian economic committee and received the Verdienstorden der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Order of Merit of the FRG) in the level of Grosses 
Verdienstkreuz mit Stern und Schulterband (Grand Cross with sash and star) for his efforts 
when he retired from the position. In the second world war, he was a partisan and fought against 
the German occupation. This is even explicitly stated in the document dealing with the 
bestowal.51  
This also applies to some degree to the Yugoslavian president Josip Broz Tito, who was a 
prominent partisan leader in the war, and his secret police kidnapped and liquidated opposition 
members directly after the war.52 The inability to decide how to deal with this issue in an 
appropriate way has led to the failure to send official congratulations for his 83rd birthday.53  
It has to be mentioned at this point that governments always awarded foreign diplomats with 
various degrees of decorations upon their retirement from the position they held. In fact, this 
was pretty much a standardised procedure, where certain diplomatic positions receive a certain 
minimum level of decoration. Deviations from this standard could be used to show either 
special gratitude if the diplomat in question has done deeds beyond their obligations or - in the 
other direction - if the diplomat was not very helpful.54 Not giving an award at all would have 
been akin to a disgrace or even a scandal, and would probably only be done if the diplomat had 
been involved in criminal actions or otherwise made themselves very unpopular among officials 
and the general populous alike. 
In their diplomatic relations, governments always try to advance their own narratives 
towards the nations that they deal with. They do this to legitimize themselves towards the 
outside, but also to a degree towards the inside. This procedure can take various forms, such as 
limiting itself and others on certain topics that are part of the narrative, like arms trade, banning 
certain people from entering their country or - as in this case - war and history. The narrative 
of West Germany forbade that officials get connected with and represent the national socialist 
past that the new government wants others to forget, and that it wants to forget itself as well. 
 
50 Facius, Gernot, “Der Held von Mogadischu: Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski ist tot” (2005), Berliner Morgenpost, 
available at: https://www.morgenpost.de/printarchiv/politik/article104165186/Der-Held-von-Mogadischu-Hans-
Juergen-Wischnewski-ist-tot.html [last accessed 11.02.2020]. 
51 Jaenicke, Verleihung des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, PA AA, BELG, Prot 704, 
596/74. 
52 Higher Regional Court of Munich, Judgement of 16th of July 2008, docket number: 6 St 005/05 (2), p. 9. 
53 Puttkamer, 83. Geburtstag Präsident Titos, PA AA, BELG, Prot 704, 214 - 704.02. 
54 Verleihung des Verdienstordens der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, PA AA, BELG, 701-705.OR-5687-JUG. 
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Therefore, the representatives were not allowed to take part in events that celebrate victory over 
Nazi Germany, such as victory parades. However, they were allowed to take part in events that 
mourn the war-dead of all sides equally.55 This is because in that way, Germany can connect 
itself to the other nations as being a victim of the war, just like everyone else, and to escape the 
narrative that portrays them as the perpetual villains of global history. Yugoslavia on the other 
hand wanted to let the world know that they liberated themselves on their own accord.56 
Therefore, they showed this with large public events, such as the aforementioned parades. This 
also helped to emphasize and legitimize the special unbound position that the country had 
chosen, being aligned to neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact, despite having had a socialist 
government.  
 It is noteworthy however that the Yugoslavs emphasized that they want to celebrate victory 
against fascism, not against Nazi Germany in particular and do not want to create anti-German 
resentment.57 This is believable, because the country had been occupied by both Germany and 
Italy. It is likely however, that this was done for diplomatic reasons, considering that both 
Germanies were very important countries, not only because the most important border of the 
entire Cold War ran through their country, but also because the FRG was an important trade 
partner of Yugoslavia.58 Despite this, the 30th anniversary of the German capitulation in 1975 
was largely celebrated, in part because this would be the last milestone occasion where the 
surviving veterans could still actively participate.59 And yet, the SFRY had problems deciding 
on its own narrative, since during the war there were several partisan groups out of which the 
People’s Liberation Army led by Tito happened to emerge as the strongest one and later 
subjugated the others.60 Another good example of the effort to connect to Germany through the 
memory of the war is one of the speeches given by Tito for the 30th anniversary, where he 
really tried to connect Germans and Yugoslavs in their struggle against fascism. He talked about 
how the progressive elements of the German people were the first to die in the concentration 
camps, which disconnects the Nazis from the rest of the German people. He also mentioned 
 
55 Beteiligung offizieller Vertreter der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der UdSSR und in Osteuropa, PA AA, 
BELG, Prot 704, 213 - 704 SOW VS-NfD. 
56  For the allied contribution to the liberation of Yugoslavia, see: Bibb, Brian Robert, "Dueling Eagles: 
Mihailovic, Tito, and the Western impact on World War II Yugoslavia" (2009). University of Tennessee Honors 
Thesis Projects, P.15, available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/1252 [last accessed 11.02.2020]. 
57 Puttkamer, Jug. Feierlichkeiten zum 30. Jahrestag der deutschen Kapitulation, PA AA, BELG, Pol 704.1o, 
formerly Pol 321.1o. 
58 Kinzer, Stephen, “Germans in Warning of Yugoslav Economy” (1991), New York Times, available at: 
 https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/28/world/germans-in-warning-on-yugoslav-economy.html [last accessed 
11.02.2020]. 
59 Sahm, Veranstaltungen in Moskau zum 30. Jahrestag des Kriegsendes, PA AA, BELG, Pol 704. 
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that the partisan warfare was a struggle of all antifascists against all enemies - foreigners and 
Yugoslavs alike. Indeed, he even explicitly mentioned the Ustasha, who he called “worse than 
the Germans”. This was seen by the contemporaries as breaking a taboo.61 
 
Conclusion 
This research looks to explain just some of the complexities of Second World War memory for 
West Germany and Yugoslavia during the post-war period: the tensions between these two 
nation states and between individual and state-level commemoration. Political questions of 
commemoration and remembrance involving national celebrations, parades and war cemeteries 
all shaped West German and Yugoslav national narratives of perpetration and victimhood. 
In spite of this, personal narratives were maintained through generational memory. This was 
demonstrated in the personal letters of West Germans expressing their desires to mourn through 
the appropriate treatment of war graves. These letters framed the issue of war graves as 
personal, often familial, and therefore devoid of political meaning. However, such personal 
mourning still conflicted with national war narratives, necessitating intermediary organisations 
to bridge the gap between individual and state remembrance. These organisations, on the West 
German side, emphasised the non-political, humanitarian position on the treatment of war-dead 
and saw this issue as potentially unifying for the two post-war states. However, Yugoslavian 
officials stressed the connection of war graves to wider political issues, particularly the 
Yugoslav narrative of fascism and victimhood, making them cautious on the issue.  
When it came to direct government communication, the war was often omitted, particularly 
the war backgrounds of individuals conducting the correspondence. National narratives and the 
tensions between them nevertheless remained in the context of celebrations and parades, with 
the West German officials being exempt from victory parades but allowed to join events of 
mourning all war-dead, for example. Again, the Yugoslav government often linked 
commemorative events and practices to their political narrative of fascism, allowing the FRG 
some relief from the label of the perpetrator, but they were not considered to have had the same 
experience of the war. A widening approach to this research, first focusing on individual 
mourning, then intermediary organisations and finally state-level commemoration exemplifies 
the contention that existed in post-war European memory. Second World War commemoration 
not only provided conflict between states such as West Germany and Yugoslavia but also more 
fundamentally between the personal and the political. 
 
61 Puttkamer, Jug. Feierlichkeiten zum 30. Jahrestag der deutschen Kapitulation, PA AA, BELG, Pol 704.1o, 
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“Folk” Culture in Yugoslavia: A Perspective Through Diplomatic 
Relations  
Karishma Antony, Julia Damphouse and Veronika Haluch 
 
 
Hobsbawm stated that ‘Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed 
by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain 
values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.’1 He continues in saying that these traditions, ‘where possible, they normally attempt to 
establish continuity with a suitable historical past.’2 Folk culture (which can be understood as 
stated above, as a ‘set of practices’) is a method in which societies, and those which govern 
them, establish their values. It is therefore important to understand the origins of folk culture, 
as they give an insight into these values, as well as the behaviours that they promote. Since folk 
culture and traditions exercise certain ideologies, it should also be understood that these 
ideologies are ‘subject to conscious construction and symbols as subject to deliberate 
manipulation’.3 Consequently, by inventing and controlling common ‘folk’ culture within a 
particular nation, one can deliberately manipulate a society’s way of thinking.  
So, what does this mean in the Yugoslav context? As a socialist state, it was formed with the 
notion that a shared sense of class identity, serving towards the comradeship of the proletariat, 
should transcend more particular forms of identity such as ethnic or religious identity. The 
result, one that came violently undone in the 1990s, was that Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, 
Montenegrins, and Macedonians tied together a strong sense of their individual ethnic and 
religious identity, with a sense of belonging to a specific nation. The Yugoslav federation was 
built on the sense of national identity of each of the republics, allowing them to foster a sense 
of identification with each republic within the context of its belonging to the Yugoslav state.4 
Especially because 80% of Yugoslavia’s citizens were from an agricultural background, each 
 
1 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
pp.99. 
2 ibid. 
3 Denich, B., 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. 
American Ethnologist, 21(2), pp.369.  
4 Volčič, Z., “Yugo-Nostalgia: Cultural Memory and Media in the Former Yugoslavia” Critical Studies in 
Media Communication, 24(1), 21-38. 
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nation and local area had a long history of folk culture.1 Crucially, this culture varied from 
region to region. Regional folk traditions differed within the national groups which composed 
the Yugoslav citizenry. Despite the pluralist themes of Yugoslav unified culture, folk culture 
remained, and has been criticised for feeding nationalism and separatism. For instance, Oana-
Cristina Popa believes that ‘nationalism or bravery, if often imaginary, is based on legends, 
myths and symbols, which are currently used to justify violence, atrocities, interethnic hatred 
or war crimes’. 2  Folk culture, which consists of said ‘legends, myths and symbols’ 
consequently has been seen by some to fuel nationalistic tensions. These nationalistic tensions 
have been recognised in escalating several conflicts in Yugoslavia, which became so severe 
that the ‘dismemberment of Yugoslavia has added the term ’ethnic cleansing’ to the global 
vocabulary’.3 Matthias Thaden commented that as a result, ‘discourses of national belonging 
became meaningful in individuals’ everyday lives’. 4  Even following the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, Thaden believes that this sense of nationalism was so potent, that it survived 
through refugees of the Yugoslav Wars, who exhibited ‘long-distance nationalism’ in their new 
environments.5 He highlights particularly that this was present in Berlin, with its ‘massive 
influx of refugees from war-torn Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina’.6 
Thus, in our secondary research, we have attempted to identify ways in which Yugoslav folk 
culture has displayed themes of nationalism. What can be seen from our archival research are 
commentaries by the West German government on the subtle presence of nationalism in the 
Yugoslav folk events that they attended. What is also present are cultural events that divert 
attention away from rising nationalism – many attempts were made to mend the destruction 
(both physical and mental) caused by the long history of atrocities committed in Yugoslavia.   
 
What is Folk Culture? 
Folk culture has more recently been criticized for its being used to further nationalism. Augustin 
Rihtman, for instance, has suggested that folk culture and festivals were only introduced by the 
 
1 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.100. 
2 Popa, O., 2012. Myths and Symbols in the Wars of Ex-Yugoslavia (1991-1999). [online] Available at: 
http://www.historica-cluj.ro/anuare/AnuarHistorica2012/12.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2019]. 
3 Denich, B., 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. 
American Ethnologist, 21(2), p.367.  
4 Thaden, M., 2016. ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ Dissolved. Yugoslav Radio Broadcasting in (West) Berlin and 
the Changing Politics of Representation, 1988-95. Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society, 64(2), pp.143. 
5 Thaden, M., 2016. ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ Dissolved. Yugoslav Radio Broadcasting in (West) Berlin and 
the Changing Politics of Representation, 1988-95. Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society, 64(2), p.142. 
6ibid. 
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post-war Yugoslavian government to secure its own legitimacy.7 In this sense, folk culture can 
be seen as a form of propaganda, as it spreads ideologies in support of established rule. Bette 
Denich is in agreement with Rihtman when she explains the use of folk culture under 
Milosevic’s government exacerbated relationships between the Communist leaders of 
Yugoslavia: ‘The Serbian nationalist revitalisation initiated a new phase of politics, in which 
the Communist leaders of different republics openly opposed each other’.8 For Denich, this 
revitalisation was a product of an ‘outburst of art, literature, and scholarship on national themes 
portrayed the Serbian history of statehood as a succession of losses’, with an emphasis on ‘loss 
and victimisation’.9  
Yet through the lens of German diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the sphere of traditional or folk culture seems to be distinctly apolitical. We contend that this 
was because, despite the political significance we now place on ethnic and national identity 
reflected in traditional culture, at the time, it seemed comparatively free from the organizing 
political paradigm of the time – socialism versus capitalism.  
Folk culture as it’s defined here, describes a sense of social interaction via the art media, and 
differs from other modes of speaking and gesturing. This distinction is based upon sets of 
cultural conventions, recognized and adhered to by all the members of the group. So that folk 
culture can be understood as the social base of a communicative process within a group, that 
can be formulated through artistic ways of expression.10 In this article, these communicative 
notions of Folk are applied to artistic representations and actions, mostly music and festivals 
focusing on music. This is why culture in this sense can be also understood as a tool of progress. 
The Yugoslav “Kulturnation” was shaped within in the scope of the cultural and intellectual 
elite during the 19th and early 20th century. South Slavic cultural interconnectivity contributed 
to the recognition and revelation of a common culture of South Slavic peoples, bringing over 
time the creation of a cultural context and network with contributors set and performing in 
various cultural (and mostly economic) centres: Zagreb, Belgrad, Ljubljana and Novi Sad.11  
 
7 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.98. 
8 Denich, B., 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. 
American Ethnologist, 21(2), p.371. 
9 ibid. 
10 Ben-Amos, D., Toward a Definition Through Folklore in Context. The Journal of American Folklore, 
84(331), Toward New Perspectives in Folklore (1971). 
11 Makuljevis, Nenad “From the art of a nation to the art of a territory” in Helsinški Odbor Za Ljudska Prava 
U Srbiji (Publ.) Yugoslavia from a Historical Perspective. (Belgrade: Delfimedia) 2017.  
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Although it should be kept in mind that Yugoslavia’s society was made up by a high proportion 
of agricultural population living outside these centres.   
Culture as a tool of progress was used for the purpose of institutional self-legitimation, 
including the self-legitimation of the ruling communist authorities themselves. Yet the duty to 
foster the development of new Yugoslav culture was not in the exclusive domain of the state 
and the party. Quite to the contrary, organizations and individuals at virtually all levels of 
society were expected to contribute to this endeavour.12  
Similar decisions were made when the German side planned on extending their political 
relations with Yugoslavia due to the Yugoslavian attitude towards the German question, calling 
for more cultural engagement unison with politics towards eastern European states and the 
fostering of ‘human contacts’. 13  
Actors of the cultural and political scene tried to create and promote a sense of supranational 
culture. In this case, the new Yugoslav culture was seen as an integral instrument of progress, 
and was expected to foster the cultural, ideological and civilisational ‘elevation’ of the 
Yugoslav population by cultivating its cultural awareness and sensibility, inculcating the ability 
to appreciate and understand art, as well as stimulating the acquisition of technical and physical 
skills. 14  This process might be considered as successful when a German theatre director 
attributes a specific area “highly cultural standard“.15  
In this sense, the notion of culture as an instrument of progress can be seen as having a 
purpose of institutional self-legitimation, including the self-legitimation of the ruling 
authorities themselves. Yet the duty to foster the development of new Yugoslav culture was not 
in the exclusive domain of the state and the party. Quite to the contrary, organizations and 
individuals at virtually all levels of society were expected to contribute to this endeavour.16 
A change in the attitude towards what forms of culture should be promoted were made 
visible through what the state and party officials set in cultural policies. From the mid-1950s, 
 
12  Mihelj,Sabina.”The dreamworld of new Yugoslav culture and the logic of cold war binaries” in 
Romjin,P.,Scott-Smith,G.and Segal,J.(eds) Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West 
.(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) 2012 p.103. 
13 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1035 “Festspiele Zagreber Sommerabend 1964”. 
14  Mihelj,Sabina.”The dreamworld of new Yugoslav culture and the logic of cold war binaries” in 
Romjin,P.,Scott-Smith,G.and Segal,J.(eds) Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) 2012. 
15 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1557 
16 Vuletic, Dean “Sounds like America: Yugoslav Soft Power in Eastern Europe” in Romijn, Peter; Scott-
Smith, Giles, Segal, Joes (edit.) Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press) 2012, 116.  
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Folk Music accorded less value, stating, that it presented an outmoded image of their state and 
did not reflect advances in economic growth and social modernisation since 1945.17 
In 1958, Marko Ristić, the president of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries, wrote that “ (...) when European intellectuals begun to take interest in us purely as 
some exotic, Balkan tribes through ‘our primitive folklore,’ folk music had portrayed an un-
modern image of Yugoslavia’s peoples, and that we need to correct the old-fashioned and one-
sided picture, which is even a little offensive for us, that the world often has of us as a 
picturesque and primitive country in which folklore is the highest artistic goal.18 Perhaps this is 
because, as Oana-Cristina Popa suggests, ‘most states in the Balkans have shown an amazing 
readiness to replace old symbols with new ones’. 19  In addition, Augustin has stated that 
activists, such as Ristić, ‘seek to create new holidays, thoroughly researching the traditional 
ones in order to extract what is ‘good’ and ‘positive’ in them from what is ‘backward’’.20 From 
this perspective, Ristić is seemingly trying to break away from Yugoslavia’s ‘backward’ past, 
which he identifies to be present in folk culture, particularly folk music. This process, Popa 
believes, is crucial in breaking away ‘from the ghosts of the past’, which she believes that the 
Balkans is doing ‘for the first time in recent history’.21  
 
Accounts on Yugoslav nationalist ideologies: Historiography 
We have explored various historiographies through our secondary research, which confirm our 
hypothesis that folk culture in Yugoslavia was largely built around particularly nationalistic 
ideologies. Crucially this engagement can be either positive promotion of a certain national 
identity it or a reaction against certain nationalisms. In addition, sources such as Matthias 
Thaden comment on West German perception of Yugoslav culture; ‘West German policy, 
which encouraged immigrants to be preoccupied with their ‘homelands’ and ‘national 
communities’ so as to discourage them from participating in the political system’.22 This is 
 
17 Vuletic, Dean “Sounds like America: Yugoslav Soft Power in Eastern Europe” in Romijn, Peter; Scott-
Smith, Giles, Segal, Joes (edit.) Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press) 2012, 118. 
18  Marko Ristić, Politička književnost (za ovu Jugoslaviju): 1944-1958. (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje, 1977), 
pp.253-261.  
19 Popa, O., 2012. Myths and Symbols in the Wars of Ex-Yugoslavia (1991-1999). [online] Available at: 
http://www.historica-cluj.ro/anuare/AnuarHistorica2012/12.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2019]. 
20 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.99. 
21 Popa, O., 2012. Myths and Symbols in the Wars of Ex-Yugoslavia (1991-1999). [online] Available at: 
http://www.historica-cluj.ro/anuare/AnuarHistorica2012/12.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2019]. 
22 Thaden, M., 2016. ‘Brotherhood and Unity’ Dissolved. Yugoslav Radio Broadcasting in (West) Berlin and 
the Changing Politics of Representation, 1988-95. Südosteuropa. Journal of Politics and Society, 64(2), p.144. 
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another to consider – what were the motives for participating in Yugoslav folk culture? Was it 
for the purpose of helping Yugoslavia settle rising nationalistic tensions, or rather for their own 
purposes as Thaden has suggested?  
The claims of historians like Rihtman Augustin, who said that the purpose of folk culture in 
Yugoslavia was to ‘establish its legitimacy and identity’ (hence the introduction of ‘festivals 
and rituals and declared public holidays by federal and state legislation’), support the idea that 
the West German government participated in Yugoslav cultural events in order to support 
stability in Yugoslavia.23  
However, Augustin also comments on how ‘most Yugoslav national holidays seek to 
traditionally commemorate historical events, especially events of the Partisan war and socialist 
revolution’, highlighting how Yugoslav authorities still promoted nationalism alongside its 
attempts in legitimising and securing its government.24 Lastly, Augustin states that ‘actual 
political situation at the end of the eighties shows strong connections between populist 
movements, traditional symbols and national mythologies accompanied with a tendency of re-
Christianization’.25  
For Denich, too, folk culture comprises of a ‘conceptualisation of ideologies’, which focuses 
on ‘nationalist ideologies’ that define relations between the people and the state ‘in terms of 
hegemony and cultural dominance’. 26  Thus, the dominant folk culture provides political 
legitimacy to the region to which it belongs. She goes on to say that ‘both Serbian and Croatian 
leaders consciously revived the same nationalist ideologies that had been implicated in the 
wartime conflagration’ during the Titoist era.27 This reflects competitive trends in securing 
political power through nationalistic themes.  
Popa is in agreement with this perspective, when she writes Yugoslavian cultural ‘symbols 
have always inflamed the passion of the rival ethnicity; they have fuelled frustrations, threats 
or, on the contrary, they have justified national pride’.28 This is particularly visible when 
looking at the examples of folk festivities that Augustin provides. He comments that in the 
 
23 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.98. 
24 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.99. 
25 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.103. 
26 Denich, B., 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. 
American Ethnologist, 21(2), p.368. 
27 Denich, B., 1994. Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide. 
American Ethnologist, 21(2), p.369. 
28 Popa, O., 2012. Myths and Symbols in the Wars of Ex-Yugoslavia (1991-1999). [online] Available at: 
http://www.historica-cluj.ro/anuare/AnuarHistorica2012/12.pdf [Accessed 1 December 2019]. 
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early, post-war years of Yugoslavia, until the 1950s, folk culture consisted of ‘frequent rallies 
with speeches and marches, involving large masses of people’.29  Often, these events had 
militaristic themes too; for example, he notes that a celebration that survives today is the ‘Day 
of Republic’, or the ‘Day of the Army’, which consists of military parades.30 
Olive Lodge, who highlights that Yugoslavia comprises of a number of provinces, ‘each 
with its own historical background’, draws attention to religious influence on national tradition 
and custom.31 She states that ‘folk festivals in Yugoslavia are particularly interesting’ due to 
the influences of these religions, as well as pagan and ancient Greek cultures.32 The survival of 
these ancient customs is said to be the richest among the Serbs. Among Serbs, ‘Church festivals 
were frequently occasions for such celebration, while the guslari or wandering bards chanted 
the old songs and ballads from village to village, so keeping alive the spirit of nationality’.33 
Here, we can see the variation of culture from province to province, which for Lodge, is widely 
caused by religious differences. The combination of religious difference and the ‘spirit of 
nationality’ indicate sentiments of separatism and the pride which Popa speaks of.  
 
Indications of Nationalism   
From our archival research, we identified some, although very limited, accounts on folk culture 
in Yugoslavia. We have attempted to interpret their significance in relation to our topic, despite 
their lack of depth. From what we can understand, they support our claims of nationalistic 
themes present in Yugoslavian folk culture, as well as general attempts to move away from 
these nationalistic sentiments. However, it should be noted that the West German government 
had very little to say on such matters.  
In an archival document, the event of Yugoslavian groups presenting their national folk 
dresses to Tito has been recorded. What is commented on first, is the development gap: 
“unverkennbar war auch hier das Entwicklungsgefälle der jugoslawischen Völker. Die 
unterentwickelten machten dabei durch farbenfrohe Kleidung wett, was ihnen die tüchtigen 
Slowenen an Exaktheit der Übungen überlegen waren”.34  
 
29 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.101. 
30 Rihtman-Augustin, D., 1990. The Metamorphosis of Festivals in a Socialist Country. Ethnologia Europaea, 
p.102. 
31 Lodge, O., 1944. Folk Festivals in Yugoslavia. Folklore, 55(2), p.59. 
32 Lodge, O., 1944. Folk Festivals in Yugoslavia. Folklore, 55(2), p.60. 
33 Lodge, O., 1944. Folk Festivals in Yugoslavia. Folklore, 55(2), p.59. 
34  Translation: „The development gap of the Yugoslav peoples was also unmistakable here. The 
underdeveloped people were soaked with colourful clothing, which slowed them down and considered the 
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These colours and “patterns and embroideries of the beautiful national costumes” varied 
from district to district.35 For instance, in Montenegro, red, black, and gold were usual colours 
in both men’s and women’s dresses, symbolising bloodshed, the death of slain heroes, and the 
“undying glory and the hope of freedom to come”.36 Apparent, here, are historical themes of 
victory and loss that promote nationalistic sentiments. Yet it is visible that these sentiments 
were unrecognised by the West German government, who instead associated Yugoslavian 
peasant traditions with poverty. Additionally, it is stated that there was “keine 
Überstrapazierung des nationalen moments” (no overuse of the national movement).37 This 
latter comment expresses a sense of caution; the fact that they added it makes it apparent that 
they were expecting highly nationalistic tones from this event beforehand. In this sense, it can 
be seen that the West German government recognised, and was vary of, rising nationalistic 
sentiments in Yugoslavia.  
In a West German document by Firma Boehringer, she recalls that Yugoslavian musical and 
folkloristic presentations by an Italian group (from Pula and Maribor) made the Yugoslavian 
audience sentimental, as it made them remember the times of the Austro-Hungarian 
monarchy.38 From this source, we can see that at least in the eyes of the members of the West 
German government, nostalgic nationalism was a common theme in folk culture.  
As well as nationalism in folk culture, what is present is a readiness to move away from 
tensions caused by rising nationalism. In August 1972, a classical music festival in central 
Serbia (in the town of Vrnjacka Banja) took place with the performance of eighty German and 
Yugoslavian singers. During this festival, Germans sung Serbian texts and folk songs in an 
atmosphere of “Solidarität und Achtung” (solidarity and respect).39 This performance took 
place near Kragujevac – a place where, in 1941, hostages were shot during a massacre. The 
festival’s promotion of ‘solidarity and respect’ near a site of trauma indicate a readiness to move 
on from Yugoslavia’s violent past. The document ends by observing that the power of music 
connects friendships of people, which suggests a potential for recovery in Yugoslavia, through 
the development of new folk festivities.40  
 
exercises” Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1535 ‘Jugoslawische Tage‘ and ‘International 
Jundendtreff”. 
35 Lodge, O., 1944. Folk Festivals in Yugoslavia. Folklore, 55(2), p.59. 
36 Lodge, O., 1944. Folk Festivals in Yugoslavia. Folklore, 55(2), p.59. 
37  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1535 ‘Jugoslawische Tage‘ and ‘International 
Jundendtreff”. 
38  Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1535 ‘Jugoslawische Tage‘ and ‘International 
Jundendtreff”. 
39 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, ‘German / Yugoslavian Chorwoche‘. 
40 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, ‘German / Yugoslavian Chorwoche‘. 
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Another archival document focuses on the International Folklore Festival in Zagreb in July 
1972. Previously, this festival consisted mainly of a Slavic audience, but the document gives 
significance to the presence of more Western peoples, which suggests that Yugoslavia was 
making efforts to become increasingly cosmopolitan at the time. Additionally, in Zagreb, was 
the 1968 planning of a Yugoslav Art Exhibition which was to be held in Germany. The items 
for exhibition would be provided by the Museum of Applied Arts in Zagreb, which is said to 
possess a “historisch interessante, schöne Sammlung” (historically interesting, beautiful 
collection’) of histories from 12th-16th century Croatia and Slovenia.41 Here, memories of folk 
culture are seen to be encouraging positive international relations, rather than nationalistic 
tensions.  
In July and August 1964, the city of Zagreb put on a cultural event called the “Zagreb 
Summer evenings”.42 A request was made to the German consulate asking for support for the 
events. This was to come in the form of finding an Impresario to help with the organization of 
several theatrical events infusing performances of the operetta “A Night in Venice”. They ask 
permission to help with certain program points because they fit well with the capabilities of 
foreign assistance. This includes theatrical performances, one called “the Development of 
Dance”, as well as a diving display for which an Olympic diving platform was arranged. There 
are no further details in the correspondence about what the rest of the programming of the 
festival was like. From this we may speculate that when it came to cultural matters, the official 
on the Yugoslav side did not care to share information generally and the official on the German 
side were not bothered to ask for details. This would indicate that in their diplomatic relations 
West Germany placed a low level of significance on cultural matters in general. The official 
from the Yugoslav side concluded his letter by stating: “I would be grateful, if the plans for the 
‘Zagreb Summer Evenings’ would be taken up. Given the poor political relationship between 
us and Yugoslavia, which is now reaching a new low, we should be all the more open to 
Yugoslav suggestions for cooperation in the apolitical field.”43  
The officials explicitly state that they would like to cooperate on cultural matters in light of 
their country’s current tense political relationship. This indicates that far from seeing the 
cultural area as fraught with potential political implications, they merely saw it as outside of 
politics. Just recognizing this form of basic mass entertainment as apolitical or otherwise free 
from ideological differences. 
 
41 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, ‘International Folklore Festival in Zagreb 1972‘. 
42 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1035 ‘Festspiele Zagreber Sommerabend 1964‘. 
43 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, B 95 1035 ‘Festspiele Zagreber Sommerabend 1964‘. 
“FOLK” CULTURE  
58 
Vuletic’s opinion is contrary to that of the idea of cultural as apolitical. He recalls that in 
1958, the Central Committee of the lcy – which comprised the party’s top leaders and had an 
ideological commission that discussed cultural matters – declared that cultural propaganda was 
more important than economic or socio-political propaganda and recognised a need to study 
how other states were promoting themselves abroad. A year later, it was observed that, with the 
changes in the Cold War, propaganda played an even greater role in the promotion of a state’s 
cultural and economic achievements. This was especially due to the ‘thaw’ in Eastern Europe 
which, under Khrushchev’s tenure as Soviet leader, saw a relaxation on restrictions in cultural 
life as well as improvements in relations with the West. The Central Committee noted that ‘in 
the new situation’ international meetings and cultural ties had become more important for 
Yugoslavia’s affirmation abroad, and it accordingly urged its artists to participate more in 
them.44  
 
Summary of Research and Conclusion 
Our main topic of research attempted to answer the question: how has folk culture reflected the 
existing, rising, and descending trends of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the time frame from 
1968 until 1975 based on statements found in correspondences between Germany and German 
diplomats in Yugoslavia.  
In order to answer this question, we have explored the following subcategories: 
1. A plurality of folk cultures built around nationalism in unified Yugoslavia.  
2. Commentary and actions by the West German government regarding the worsening 
situation in Yugoslavia. 
3. Movements away from nationalism in Yugoslavia, focused on healing wounds created 
by toxic nationalism. 
We experienced great difficulty in finding direct statements on Yugoslav folk culture, or 
even culture in general, by going through the documents of the political archive of the foreign 
office of Germany. We concluded that the culture of the common people had little to do with 
West German interests, because as mentioned before, it seems that the West German 
government regarded such festivities and events as apolitical – and thus of little significance. 
Therefore, the focus was set on how Yugoslav Folk Culture was perceived by the employees 
of Wsern German foreign offices and to investigate if there were any political ambitions 
 
44 Vuletic, Dean “Sounds like America: Yugoslav Soft Power in Eastern Europe” in Romijn, Peter; Scott-
Smith, Giles, Segal, Joes (edit.) Divided Dreamworlds? The Cultural Cold War in East and West (Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam University Press) 2012, p.117. 
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phrased following the perception of cultural events, practices and productions. The relationship 
of the two countries was affected by the German partition, and after the discontinuities that 
followed, they resumed their relations in 1968. The correspondences were mostly written in the 
context of bigger music or theatre festivals held in Yugoslavia, or visits of West German artists 
in the country.  Just a few were on visits vice versa. But impressions of Yugoslav culture could 
be found, especially when it came to differ between each nationality (for example, 
commentaries on Yugoslavian folk dress).  
Through our secondary research, we were able to find more information specific to 
Yugoslavia’s folk culture, although even this was limited. From our research, we could see that 
many historians believed in the role of folk culture inspiring nationalistic sentiments and thus 
worsening the already tense situation in Yugoslavia. This was vaguely confirmed by our 
primary research though descriptions were unfocused and overgeneralised, so required a lot of 
contextual interpretation.  
As a result, it was concluded that the West German government held little interest in the 
cultural affairs of Yugoslavia as it was seen to be apolitical and therefore, to them, of little 
value.  
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Political Representations of Yugoslav Culture in German Diplomatic 
Files 
Liu Chenxi, Vincent de Bruin and Sophia Jereczek 
 
 
As the previous texts in this volume have illustrated the varies perspectives of Yugoslav cultural 
policies and productions, the following article are all aimed to describe and analyse the 
representations of Yugoslav culture within the political discourses. The general approach is to 
discuss the cultural and political history of Yugoslavia through the prism of diplomatic relations 
based on the files in the German diplomatic archive. Our common question is that apart from 
analysing the political influences on cultural activities, does culture (in a broader sense) have 
counter effects on politics, and how does culture reveal itself in political discourses. As the 
whole political sphere being relatively broad, we tried to focus on different aspects of the 
Yugoslav culture in multiple political dimensions, and further developed our own specific 
questions: 
First, in the background of the Cold War, studying the way that Yugoslavia place its culture 
when struggling for a political alternative to the existing Cold War divisions may show us how 
international power struggle affects the Yugoslav culture. Second, on the ideological level, 
different observations of Yugoslav economy from the two Germanys hints us how the same 
“facts” could be influenced by cultural thinking patterns. Finally, an analyzation of the 
Yugoslav immigrants in the West Germany draws attention to the culture of political 
communities in a foreign land. 
Although the topics we have chosen differ a lot, they intermingle with each other under the 
framework of political representation. In addition, we all tried to take approach to these topics 
from a transnational or even global history perspective by placing our questions beyond the 
national borders and comparing sources from different countries.  
Based on the sources that we found during the archive visits, the time period of our research 
topics is from the 1960s to the 1970s. Though our discoveries and analyzations may not be 
satisfactory due to the limitation of the sources, these articles tend to serve as an attempt to 
analyse culture and cultural policies in a global political discourse. 
 
1. Yugoslavia’s cultural position in the non-aligned movement 
This part tries to analyse Yugoslavia’s non-alignment policy from a cultural perspective.  
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During the time of Cold War, Yugoslavia tried to conduct a policy of “staying apart from 
both East and West”1, in order to alleviate the pressure of diplomatic isolation after Tito-Stalin 
split. Such policy required Yugoslavia to seek new allies from the countries who kept their 
distance from any major power bloc on a global scale. This led to Yugoslavia’s promotion of 
the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade, 1961.  
However, the political goals of the non-aligned countries were not always consistent: while 
the alliance of Egypt and Yugoslavia emphasized the possibility of “neutralism”, other 
countries such as China were more eager to promote an “Asian-Africanism” based on anti-
whiteness or anti-colonialism background.2 As the two concepts more or less contradict each 
other, like Jeffrey Byrne pointed out, one of the important issues when studying the non-aligned 
movement is whether the movement was committed to creating a unified identity.3  
On the other hand, the question can also be formulated as whether a common identity 
constitutes the prerequisite for the political goals that they wanted to achieve. Current research 
analysed the neutralism strategy from the perspective of political and diplomatic history, but 
the impact of this policy on the representation of Yugoslav culture has not been thoroughly 
explored.4 Therefore, this research hopes to examine how Yugoslavia placed its culture when 
struggling for a political alternative to the existing Cold War divisions, and as a European 
country, whether the “culture of whiteness” had an influence on its fight for the leadership of 
the non-aligned movement. 
Based on the sources from the German diplomatic archive and the Records of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, this research also attempts to take a global historical 
perspective by placing Yugoslav cultural policy in a global context. As the Belgrade conference 
of non-aligned countries was a crucial step for Yugoslavia during the formation of non-aligned 
movement, the sources are mainly from the time period around 1961.  
 
Approaching “Third World” 
 
1 Aleksandar Životić and Jovan Čavoški, “On the Road to Belgrade: Yugoslavia, Third World Neutrals, and 
the Evolution of Global Non-Alignment, 1954–1961”, Journal of Cold War Studies, Volume 18, Number 4, Fall 
2016, p. 81 
2  Čavoški, Jovan, “Between Great Powers and Third World neutralists- Yugoslavia and the Belgrade 
Conference of the Non- Aligned Movement, 1961”, in The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, London: 
Routledge, 2014, pp. 184-206. 
3 Byrne, Jeffrey James, “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle 
for Non-Alignment”, The International History Review, 2015, Vol. 37, No. 5, p. 914. 
4 See Irwin Z., “The Untold Stories of Yugoslavia and Nonalignment”, in Ognjenović G., Jozelić J. (eds) 
Revolutionary Totalitarianism, Pragmatic Socialism, Transition, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 139-166. 
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On the one hand, it can be seen that Yugoslavia tried to tie itself closer to Asian, African and 
Latin American countries, such as establishing cultural exchange agreements with countries as 
far as Indonesia.  
They set up projects to encourage exchange students, language learning, and “… shall 
endeavour to include in the curricula of history and geography of its educational institutions”.5 
Unlike today’s highly globalized cultural exchanges, Germans actually questioned the 
effectiveness of such agreement, saying that whether a real cultural exchange can be achieved 
was questionable, for “the languages of the two countries hardly mean anything for each other, 
which is why so far no Indonesian student is interested in learning Serbo-Croatian.”6 
Although the Germans questioned the sincerity among non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia 
did seem to be very popular at the time. The Belgrade conference in 1961 opened with a four-
day conference of African exchange students in European universities, as Yugoslavia 
demonstrated its strong interests in uniting with African countries, which “was for them of 
much greater importance than was usually believed”7, as commented by the monitor of Radio 
Free Europe. Besides assisting personnel training at vocational schools, universities and 
institutes, “About 100 African students are now [1962] studying in Yugoslavia on scholarships 
and fellowships.”8 However, the actual influences of these cultural cooperations require further 
study. 
 
Distance from Europe 
On the other hand, although there was the expanding gap between “the West” and “Europe”, 
the countries from outside Europe hold a rather ambiguous understanding of this. Therefore, 
Yugoslavia sometimes had to distance itself from the European identity. 
Under the Iron Curtain, Europe was divided into East and West. Like other relatively small 
countries, Yugoslavia had to strive to “establish a solid balance in their relations both with East 
and West”9 for its limited power on the global stage. However, this does not mean that the split 
of East and West was the only tension in the Cold War. Other perspectives of cultural 
background also competed with each other on the battlefield.  
For example, the discourse of (non)whiteness was a powerful cultural-political tool, and 
Yugoslavia’s anxiety about its “whiteness” is also quite visible. They warned about the Chinese 
 
5 Indonesische-jugoslawisches Kulturabkommen, Djakarta, den 22. Juli 1959, Article 4. 
6 Indonesische-jugoslawisches Kulturabkommen, Djakarta, den 22. Juli 1959, S. 2. 
7 “Yugoslavia and Egypt”, 31 August 1962. HU OSA 300-8-3-9591, p. 1. 
8 “Yugoslavia and Egypt”, 31 August 1962. HU OSA 300-8-3-9591, p. 1. 
9 “Yugoslavia Looks Both Ways”, 30 April 1963. HU OSA 300-8-3-9630, p. 1. 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS  
65 
activities in Asian and African countries, “which clearly leads to racial hatred and the 
implacable enmity of coloured people against the whites.”10 For Yugoslavia, how to get rid of 
the cultural background of whiteness, or how to confront when a country like China 
problematized it, was very important when fighting for the leadership of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. 
In addition to that, the divided Europe itself played as not only geopolitical but also cultural 
identity. Although Yugoslavia accused Chinese promotion of “Asian-Africanism” as an act of 
exclusiveness11, it also consciously distanced itself from other neutral European countries such 
as the Nordic countries and Switzerland in the Non-Aligned Movement. Although these 
countries were neutral, they were not invited to participate in the non-alignment meetings.12 
Because of the limited sources, this segment does not intend to make any conclusion on 
Yugoslavia’s representation of culture in political discourses during the Cold War. Rather, it 
attempts to draw more attention to the role that Yugoslav culture played in the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Geopolitical transformation often requires the establishment of new identity, thus 
forming new cultural narratives. During such unprecedented intimate political cooperation with 
non-European countries, how far did the political trust rely on the construction of the same 
identity, and whether these politically orientated cultural exchanges have actual impacts on 
Yugoslav cultural identity may be worth future studying. 
 
 
2. Two perspectives on the Yugoslav economy: the differences between East- 
and West German observations 
 
This section is a short analysis of the observations on Yugoslavia’s economy made by the 
diplomatic services of the West German Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD), and the East 
German Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR). Both the BRD and the DDR maintained at 
least a basis of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and employed a diplomatic service in 
Belgrade, where the reports used in this section were written. The initial idea was to analyse 
how the diplomats from both sides portrayed and interpreted Yugoslavia’s unique economic 
culture. This however, failed to be realised, as the nature of the documents in the archives was 
 
10 “Yugoslav Charges Chinese Promote Racism”, 30 July 1963. HU OSA 300-8-3-9715, p. 1. 
11 “Yugoslav Charges Chinese Promote Racism”, 30 July 1963. HU OSA 300-8-3-9715, p. 3. 
12 Auswärtiges Amt, B130/4206A: Konferenz der Neutralen Staaten in Bled am 1. 9. 1961. Bohn, 27/07/1961, 
S. 1-3. 
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too factual and objective to be used in such a way. The report below is a comparison between 
the observations made by the BRD and the DDR on political events related to Yugoslavia’s 
economy, as well as Yugoslavia’s economic developments. Since there were some striking 
differences between the relayed information from both Germanies, this report should still have 
some relevance to the theme, regardless of the failure to answer the originally intended research 
question.   
In order to assess the East- and West German perspectives on the Yugoslavian economy, a 
short review of this economy is in order. The first paragraph of this section covers the academic 
discourse on the topics of self-management and decentralisation in Yugoslavia. The second 
paragraph is an assessment of the West German reports on Yugoslavia’s economy, and the third 
paragraph is a similar assessment of the reports from the East Germans. By comparing the 
secondary literature to the reports, some things can be said about the perspectives of both sides. 
The goal is to find the topics that are focused on, as well as the topics that are avoided or only 
vaguely mentioned. Comparing the reports from both sides with each other, as well as with the 
secondary literature, serves as a rudimentary way of triangulating the data from the different 
sources. For several reasons, it is important not to come to strong conclusions or claims. Firstly, 
these archival sources are circumstantial, only covering a few years and events, and the sources 
from East Germany do not cover the same years and events as the sources from West Germany. 
Secondly, the contexts in which the reports from both sides were written are different, since the 
quality of both diplomatic services, their access to information, and their mandates from home 
were different.  
 
Yugoslavia’s economy in academic literature 
This section deals with the academic perception of Yugoslavia’s economy, most notably its 
system of self-management. The system of self-management in the Yugoslavian economy can 
be regarded as a unique project within the realm of socialist experiments, and came about as a 
reaction to the Tito-Stalin split.13 After the split, Tito’s Yugoslavia was neither aligned with the 
East, nor with the West. This made Yugoslavia a rather neutral country during the Cold War, 
and influences from both sides shaped its developments. This could be observed in 
Yugoslavia’s economic system, which was socialist in name, while bearing features of 
capitalism as well. After the split between Tito and Stalin, Yugoslavia’s original plans for rapid 
industrialisation aided by the Soviet Union had to be withdrawn. Tito’s changed the plans for 
 
13 Hudson, 2003, p. 42-45. 
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Yugoslavia’s economy, and initiated the policy of self-management of enterprises by their 
workers, which required significant decentralisation on the political side. The forefront of this 
new development was Yugoslavia’s agricultural sector, and it was here that self-management 
was first tried in practice. Politically, the People’s Committees and the workers’ councils 
received greater influence and a wider range of powers as local governmental bodies. In 
addition, power was transferred from the federal to the republic level.14  
Between 1952 and 1965, Yugoslavia experienced over a decade of rapid economic growth. 
This initial success did not last long, and the first signs of overstretching and decline already 
appeared as soon as 1962.15 The problems of Yugoslavia’s economy during the late 60s, 70s 
and 80s have several causes, which partially lie in the economic structure of the country. 
Fundamental problems were the exclusion of the workers from ‘significant decision making’ 
in the self-management system, as well as the enormous amount of strikes, or ‘work stoppages’ 
that paralysed the Yugoslavian economy.16 Inflation was especially high in the (late) 80s and 
90s, which fall out of the scope of the documents. Nevertheless, with inflation as high as 30% 
in 1965/6617, it could still be an important topic in the documents at hand. 
 
Observations from West German diplomatic reports 
The documents that were used to analyse the West German perspective on the Yugoslav 
economy are all part of a series of correspondence between the West German diplomats in 
Belgrade and the Foreign Ministry back home in Bonn. The first entry is from the 24th of 
November 1970, and the last entry from the 28th of May 1971. The reports number a total of 
72 pages.  
When it comes to West German interest in Yugoslavia’s economy, the cultural aspects of it 
are not of any importance. West German diplomats seemed to observe Yugoslavia’s economy 
merely from a political point of view, as they reported on conflicts between law and citizens, 
tensions between nationalities, and the shortcomings of the system of self-management. This 
can be seen in the careful analysis of the composition of workers’ committees on the basis of 
ethnicity/nationality. For example, the diplomats reported the exact numbers of Serbs, Croats, 
Slovenians and other nationalities that were in a delegation coming to the Congress on Self-
Management in 1971.18 At the Congress, they also observed some cynicism among the visitors 
 
14 Hudson, 2003, p. 45-48. 
15 Liotta, 2001, p 5. 
16 Liotta, 2001, p. 5-6 
17 Liotta, 2001, p. 6. 
18 B42/232, p. 70-71 
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from the DDR, who were apparently convinced that the Yugoslav economy would not last much 
longer.19 
The West German diplomats relayed several speeches held by President Tito and the party 
Presidium.20 The speeches reveal that the Yugoslav leadership was aware of the economic and 
political problems in the country and was trying to reform the country in several ways. Apart 
from mentioning the required reforms, the leadership also mentions sources of misinformation 
and slander by parties both in- and outside of Yugoslavia.  
 
Observations from East German diplomatic reports  
The sources used to analyse the East German observations are two series of correspondence 
between East German diplomats stationed in Belgrade and their colleagues in Berlin. The first 
series contains messages from several months in the year 1960, and numbers a total of 31 pages. 
The second series is a rather unorganised mixture of documents from the years 1971, 1972, and 
1974. Of this series, 25 pages were deemed relevant for this research.  
The East Germans closely watched the relations between Yugoslavia and the socialist block 
and were interested in the achievements of Yugoslavia’s economy. They did not seem to be 
interested in Yugoslavian labour culture. Their diplomats sometimes criticised Yugoslavia’s 
economy from a Marxist perspective, practically claiming that the Yugoslavs used a wrong 
interpretation of Marxism in the creation and development of their economic and political 
system.21 
The documents contain East German reports on a conference on self-management held in 
1974. They report that the Yugoslav leadership blames ‘the forces of the West’ for using the 
hardship and internal conflicts of Yugoslavia for their own gain. This is the same type of blame 
shifting that the West Germans mentioned in their reports. That said, the Yugoslav leadership 
also looks at their own mistakes, and state that using ‘self-critique’ is an important task in their 
political work.22 The East Germans recognise the many economic problems that Yugoslavia 
was facing, and state that Yugoslavia’s reforms are an attempt to overcome the failures of the 
self-management system.23 
 
 
 
19 B42/232, p. 73. 
20 B42/232 p. 239-242 
21 M1A 5156, p. 22 
22 M1C 890 76, p. 1-2 
23 M1C 890 76, p. 7-9 
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3. Yugoslav immigrants in West Germany – A cultural politically united society 
abroad? An attempt to give a perspective of Yugoslavs (political) attitude in 
Germany 
 
In the context of giving different perspectives to the Yugoslav culture in political discourses, 
the following article is about the Yugoslavs in Germany. As the timeframe of this work is the 
1960s and 1970s, the sources of this article found in the Auswärtiges Amt are all from the 
1960s. 
This paper tries to give a perspective of the political, and thus cultural, attitude of Yugoslavs 
living in West Germany and their cultural-political interest. As political interests and opinions 
are part of the cultural identity of a society, this article will show the cultural attitudes of 
Yugoslav immigrants in Germany through their political attitude. 
To answer the question: “Yugoslav immigrants in West Germany – A cultural politically 
united society abroad”, it will be figured out, based on secondary literature, the main reasons 
for the immigration of Yugoslavs to Germany. After that, two sources from the political archive 
of the Auswärtiges Amt will be analysed. 
 
Reasons for the Yugoslav immigration to West Germany 
In first place, it is necessary to know the main reasons for the immigration of the Yugoslavs to 
West Germany. Many Yugoslavs migrated to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s as guest-
workers, especially because of harder “bad” working conditions in their homeland or the lack 
of work. Even though unemployment may be a reason for the migratory movement, most of the 
Yugoslav guest-workers didn´t emigrate because of unemployment.24 Another cause was the 
wage differential between West Europe and Yugoslavia. The ideal of many Yugoslav guest-
workers was to work “some years” in West Germany or other western European countries and 
come back with savings. Both countries, West Germany and Yugoslavia, emphasized the 
temporary character of the residence in West Germany. Still, this temporary aspect did not have 
a political or legal base. In the end, most of the Yugoslavs stayed permanently in West 
Germany, even though they had planned to stay only some years.25 Nevertheless, the Yugoslav 
 
24 cf. Romic: Sprachidentität und -struktur der zweiten Generation ex-jugoslawischer Migrantennachkommen 
in Deutschland, S.187. 
25 cf. Romic: Sprachidentität und -struktur der zweiten Generation ex-jugoslawischer Migrantennachkommen 
in Deutschland, S.189. 
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state tried, mostly politically, to maintain the loyalty of the guest-workers to Yugoslavia.26 As 
it can be seen, many Yugoslavs living in West Germany left Yugoslavia because of economic 
reasons. Nonetheless, others were exiled because of political differences. Thus, there was a 
great spectrum of causes to leave the country of origin which lead to different political attitudes 
and opinions. In the end, those reflect a part of the Yugoslav culture abroad. 
 
Analysis of the documents 
With reference to the different motives of leaving Yugoslavia, next two documents from the 
archives will be analysed, which give an insight into the cultural political attitude of the 
Yugoslav immigrants in West Germany. 
In the first place, a document from the BRD about the development of the emigration of 
Yugoslavia will be analysed. This document describes, on the one hand, the nationalism and 
federalism inside and outside of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it illustrates the political 
organisations and their rivalries in the context of emigration. 
After that, the second document from West Germany about the support of the entry of Croats 
to West Germany will be considered. It will show the different (and expected) behaviour of the 
Croats but also other Yugoslav nations living in Germany. 
 The first document “Die Entwicklung der Emigration aus Jugoslawien” was signed on the 
08/05/1961 in München from the “Studiengruppe Südost München 15”27. The following part 
will focus on the political attitude of Serbs and Croats to show cultural diversity. 
In the first place, it differentiates three political tendencies that compete with each other: the 
“great-Serbian”, “Great-Croatian” and Yugoslavian. 28  The Serbs are divided into one 
nationalist group, which considerate Tito as an enemy of the people and democracy and suffer 
the Croat Ustascha-propaganda against the Serbs. Then, several groups that all support the 
Yugoslavian state but distinguish between a more federative state, a democratic and anti-
communism state and a unitary state.29 
Another nationalist tendency can be found in two Croat organisations, one of them – the 
"HNO" – had its central in München. In an opinion poll made in London 196030 90% of the 
exiled Croats voted for the independence of Croatia. The most common reasons for emigration 
 
26 cf. Baraulina: Ägyptische, afghanische und serbische Diasporagemeinden in Deutschland und ihre Beiträge 
zur Entwicklung ihrer Herkunftsländer, S.18 
27 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B12/336. 
28 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B12/336, S.2. 
29 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B12/336, S. 9-12. 
30 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B12/336, S. 17. 
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were the wish for political, social and economic freedom. Nevertheless, there were also Croats 
that wanted a united Yugoslavia: the newspaper "Kroatische Morgenröte" published in 
München declared themselves for a united state of the Yugoslavs, including political, cultural, 
economic and social equality.31 
All in all, the political spectrum also abroad was very diverse and went from Pro-Yugoslavia 
opinions, to ideas of a politically changed Yugoslavia and nationalist attitudes which were Anti-
Yugoslavia. 
Nevertheless, it is important to know that the analysis of the Studiengruppe Südost München 
focussed on politically active groups and formations of the Yugoslavs. Additionally, it was 
working for the German government which was probably more interested in possible dangerous 
political groups than moderate opinions. As described in the beginning, many Yugoslavs came 
to West Germany because of economic reasons with the intention to go back and not out of 
political dissatisfaction. 
The second document "Förderung der Einreise kroatischer Flüchtlinge aus Österreich und 
Italien in die Bundesrepublik" was signed on 26/06/1962 in Bonn from the Bundesministerium 
des Inneren. It explains the behaviour and political interests of Croats in Germany and the 
reaction of other Yugoslavs living in Germany to the Croat nationalism. 
The 7000 Croats in Germany show different political and cultural interests: some groups 
prefer the Yugoslav state, others the hegemony of Serbia. Still, there are Croats that argue in 
favour of an independent state of Croatia.32 This last group has different organisations in 
Germany and the most extremist, which is connected to the Ustascha, attacked the Yugoslav 
trade mission in 196233 and in the same year committed an attack by bombing a Swedish 
department that represented Yugoslav interests. 34  Other Yugoslavs in Germany protested 
against these and other anti-Yugoslav activities35, which shows an approval to the Yugoslav 
state and cultural identification with Yugoslavia aboard. 
Especially the guest workers had a loyal attitude to Tito and the regime. As it has been 
demonstrated, most of the guest-workers had the intention to go back to Yugoslavia after some 
years of working and saving money in West Germany. Thus, the guest-workers can be 
considered as Yugoslavs who conform with the Yugoslav political and cultural identity. 
 
31 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B12/336, S. 16. 
32 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B82/1222, S.2. 
33 cf. Thaden: Politischer Aktivismus von Exilkroaten, S: 85 
34 cf. Brey: Bonn und Belgrad, S.636. 
35 cf. Auswärtiges Amt, B82/1222, S. 3. 
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Because of that, it comes to conflicts between the guest workers and (nationalist) Croats which 
can be interpreted as cultural conflicts. 
As can be seen, many Yugoslav immigrants identified themselves with the Yugoslav culture 
and politics, even Croats. The reason they left was more economic than out of political or 
cultural conflicts. Still, some emigrants – mostly Croats but also Serbs – left Yugoslavia out of 
political reasons or because they could not identify with the culture of one Yugoslavia but only 
with their national one. 
Answering the question of whether Yugoslav immigrants in West Germany formed a 
cultural, politically united society abroad, the Yugoslav immigrants in West Germany can be 
described as a culturally divided society out of cultural political reasons. The cause of the 
migration influenced the political attitude: as it has been shown, the Yugoslavs who have left 
because of economic reasons, used to identify themselves with the Yugoslav culture and (at 
least) conform with the Yugoslav state. Other Yugoslavs, who left the country because they 
opposed to the idea of one Yugoslav nation, had separative attitudes and couldn´t identify 
themselves with the Yugoslav culture and politics. 
 
4. Conclusion 
After skimming over the three segments, we can see there are three layers of political discourse 
in our research. In the background of the Cold War, not only international relationships had 
influences on cultural policies, defining culture also played a role in geopolitical discourses. 
Today people discuss the difficulties of identity that former Yugoslav countries encountered 
when joining the EU, these difficulties may come from not only the historical traditions and 
economic situations, but are also related to the political doctrine of searching for alternatives 
outside Europe in the last century.  
Apart from the more “obvious” clashes among international cultural identities, ideology 
provides another perspective to understand the relationship between culture and politics. The 
reports from East and West Germany show significant overlap in the topics they cover. Both 
sides were mostly interested in the economic and political developments in Yugoslavia. The 
documents analysed in this segment mostly focused on tensions in domestic politics, ethnic 
strife, economic problems, elections, and speeches. The assessment of Yugoslavia’s economy 
in these documents was purely observational, with some judgment being made from an 
ideological standpoint. Where the West Germans regarded the failures of the self-management 
system as a mere fact, the East Germans tried to explain this through ideology. 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS  
73 
Finally, even people who had the same background tied culture with politics differently. The 
cultural political Yugoslav society in West Germany went from nationalists who oppose the 
idea of the state of Yugoslavia to others who identify themselves with their country of origin 
and protest against separatist attitudes. 
Instead of analysing the division of culture and politics, our topic hopes to focus on the 
entanglement of cultural and political discourses. Discussing from national, ideological and 
individual perspectives, our research illustrates that different aspects of culture also exist within 
the seemingly “pure” political issue, and sometimes even have counter-effects on the latter. We 
also hope to show that the method of comparison is indispensable during such research. 
However, these different aspects or layers of political cultures are not always 
distinguishable. They usually overlap and sometimes even conflict with each other. Therefore, 
the delicate relationship of culture and politics must go through careful examination before 
coming to any conclusion, and more analysis from a transnational or global historical 
perspective is needed. 
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